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Menu Theorems for Bilateral Contracting

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  • Han, Seungjin

Abstract

This paper studies the bilateral contracting environment where multiple principals negotiate contracts with multiple agents independently. It is shown that equilibrium allocations associated with (pure strategy) perfect Bayesian equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of negotiation schemes can be supported by pure strategy perfect Bayesian equilibria relative to the set of menus. It is also shown that equilibrium allocations associated with all perfect Bayesian equilibria relative to any ad hoc set of negotiation schemes can be supported by correlated equilibria relative to the set of menus, where the set of states is simply the set of feasible probability distributions over payoff-relevant variables. Moreover, equilibrium allocations associated with all equilibria relative to the set of menus persist even if principals use more complex negotiation schemes.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Vancouver School of Economics in its series Microeconomics.ca working papers with number han-04-01-29-10-05-13.

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Length: 0 pages
Date of creation: 29 Jan 2004
Date of revision: 29 Jan 2004
Handle: RePEc:ubc:pmicro:han-04-01-29-10-05-13

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Keywords: Mechanism Design; Bilateral Contracting; Mutliple Principals; Multiple Agents;

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References

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  1. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
  2. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
  3. Paul Klemperer, 2002. "What Really Matters in Auction Design," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 16(1), pages 169-189, Winter.
  4. Andrea Prat & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Games Played Through Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 989-1026, 07.
  5. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. McAfee, R Preston, 1993. "Mechanism Design by Competing Sellers," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(6), pages 1281-1312, November.
  7. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November.
  8. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2003. "Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 757-791, 05.
  9. Ilya Segal, 1999. "Contracting With Externalities," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(2), pages 337-388, May.
  10. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  11. Michael Peters, 1999. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Working Papers peters-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Yu Chen, 2013. "Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation," Caepr Working Papers 2013-003, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  2. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2011. "Competing Mechanism Games of Moral Hazard: Communication and Robustness," CEIS Research Paper 196, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 10 Jun 2011.
  3. Sambuddha Ghosh & Seungjin Han, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-03, McMaster University, revised May 2013.
  4. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Sequential Contracting with Multiple Principals," Discussion Papers 1457, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  5. Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François & Attar, Andrea, 2014. "Nonexclusive competition under adverse selection," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 9(1), January.
  6. Alessandro Pavan & Giacomo Calzolari, 2008. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," Carlo Alberto Notebooks 85, Collegio Carlo Alberto.
  7. Han, Seungjin, 2014. "Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-95.
  8. Peters, Michael, 2006. "Truncated Hedonic Equilibrium," Microeconomics.ca working papers peters-06-04-11-02-42-39, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 03 Mar 2009.

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