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Common Agency Games with Separable Preferences

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Author Info

  • Attar Andrea

    (IDEI, University of Toulouse
    Concordia University)

  • Gwenäel Piaser

    ()
    (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca’ Foscari)

  • Nicolas Porteiro

    (University Pablo de Olavide)

Abstract

This paper examines the role of the direct mechanisms in common agency games. We show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for a version of the Revelation Principle to hold in finite generic games. The result goes through without imposing any restriction on the principals’ payoffs. Therefore, it is still possible to restrict attention to direct mechanisms without any loss of generality even when competition over contracts is considered.

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File URL: http://www.unive.it/media/allegato/DIP/Economia/Working_papers/Working_papers_2006/WP_DSE_Piaser_28_06.pdf
File Function: First version, 2006
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" in its series Working Papers with number 2006_28.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_28

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Keywords: Revelation Principle; Common Agency; Separable Preferences;

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References

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  1. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 1998. "Efficient Private Production of Public Goods under Common Agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 25(2), pages 194-218, November.
  2. Grossman, Gene & Helpman, Elhanan, 1993. "Protection for Sale," CEPR Discussion Papers, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers 827, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Biais, Bruno & Martimort, David & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Competing Mechanisms in a Commun Value Environment," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 75, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  4. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
  5. Deaton,Angus & Muellbauer,John, 1980. "Economics and Consumer Behavior," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521296762.
  6. Prat, A. & Rustichini, A., 1999. "Games Played Through Agents," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1999-68, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  7. Versaevel, Bruno & de Villemeur, Étienne, 2003. "Conflict and Cooperation on R&D Markets," IDEI Working Papers, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse 191, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
  8. Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December.
  9. Martín Rama & Guido Tabellini, . "Lobbying by Capital and Labor over Trade and Labor Market Policies," Working Papers, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University 94, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  10. Ilya Segal & Michael D. Whinston, 2003. "Robust Predictions for Bilateral Contracting with Externalities," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 71(3), pages 757-791, 05.
  11. Attar, Andrea & Piaser, Gwenael & Porteiro, Nicolas, 2007. "Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 590-593, July.
  12. Dixit, Avinash & Grossman, Gene M. & Helpman, Elhanan, 1997. "Common Agency and Coordination: General Theory and Application to Government Policy Making," Scholarly Articles 3450061, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  13. Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 333-337, June.
  14. Bisin, A. & Guaitoli, D., 1998. "Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 98-24, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  15. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series, CESifo Group Munich 575, CESifo Group Munich.
  16. Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  17. Attar Andrea & Campioni Eloisa & Piaser Gwenael, 2006. "Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-35, October.
  18. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
  19. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:11:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  20. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  21. Aidt, Toke S., 1998. "Political internalization of economic externalities and environmental policy," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 69(1), pages 1-16, July.
  22. Gwenael Piaser, 2005. "Stochastic and deterministic menus in common agency games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-6.
  23. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Seungjin Han, 2010. "On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-04, McMaster University, revised Jun 2012.
  2. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:11:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
  3. Gwenael Piaser, 2005. "Stochastic and deterministic menus in common agency games," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 4(11), pages 1-6.
  4. Gwenaël Piaser, 2006. "The Biais-Martimort-Rochet equilibrium with direct mechanisms," Working Papers, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari" 2006_33, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".

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