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Abstract

This paper examines the role of the revelation principle in common agency games. We show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the revelation principle to hold. Therefore, it is still possible to restrict attention to direct mechanisms without any loss of generality even when competition over contracts is considered.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2003102.

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Date of creation: 00 Dec 2003
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Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2003102

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design

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1. Biais, Bruno & Martimort, David & Rochet, Jean-Charles, 1998. "Competing Mechanisms in a Commun Value Environment," IDEI Working Papers 75, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
   
   • Bruno Biais & David Martimort & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2000. "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 799-838, July.
2. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
   
   • David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
3. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July.
4. Peters, Michael, 2003. "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-109, July.
   
   • Michael Peters, 2000. "Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency," Working Papers peters-00-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.

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Cited by:

1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:4:y:2005:i:11:p:1-6 is not listed on IDEAS
2. Seungjin Han, 2010. "On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency," Department of Economics Working Papers 2010-04, McMaster University, revised Jun 2012.
   
   • Han, Seungjin, 2012. "On take it or leave it offers in common agency," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 117(3), pages 777-781.
   • Han, Seungjin, 2011. "On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency," Micro Theory Working Papers seungjin_han-2011-11, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 18 Jun 2012.
3. Gwenaël Piaser, 2006. "The Biais-Martimort-Rochet equilibrium with direct mechanisms," Working Papers 2006_33, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
   
   • Gwenael Piaser, 2004. "The Biais-Martimort-Rochet equilibrium with direct mechanisms," Game Theory and Information 0412007, EconWPA.
4. Peters, Michael & Troncoso-Valverde, Cristian, 2010. "A Folk Theorem for Competing Mechanisms," Micro Theory Working Papers michael_peters-2010-17, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 10 Jun 2010.

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