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On multiple agent models of moral hazard

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Author Info
Andrea Attar (IDEI, Toulouse)
Eloisa Campioni (LUISS, University of Rome)
Gwenaël Piaser () (Department of Economics, University Of Venice Ca’ Foscari)
Uday Rajan (Ross School of Business, University of Michigan)

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Abstract

In multiple principal, multiple agent models of moral hazard, we provide conditions under which the outcomes of equilibria in direct mechanisms are preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. We discuss the role of random allocations and recommendations and relate the result to the existing literature.

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File URL: http://www.dse.unive.it/fileadmin/templates/dse/wp/WP_DSE_Piaser_32_06.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function: First version, 2006
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Venice "Ca' Foscari", Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 2006_32.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:ven:wpaper:2006_32

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Related research
Keywords: Moral Hazard; Multiple Agents; Direct Mechanism.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 333-337, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Andrea Prat & Aldo Rustichini, 2003. "Games Played Through Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 989-1026, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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