Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents : a comment
Abstract
In this note we consider a basic property of common agency models: pure strategy equilibria of games where principals compete in direct mechanisms are robust to the possibility that principals might deviate and use more complex indirect mechanisms to design their contracts. We show that this property can be generalized to multi-principal multi-agent models.Download Info
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Paper provided by Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) in its series CORE Discussion Papers with number 2004050.Length:
Date of creation: 00 Jul 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cor:louvco:2004050
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Keywords:Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
References
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