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Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection

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  • Carmona, Guilherme
  • Fajardo, Jose

Abstract

We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be su±cient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches.

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File URL: http://fesrvsd.fe.unl.pt/WPFEUNL/WP2006/wp490.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia in its series FEUNL Working Paper Series with number wp490.

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Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: 2006
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:unl:unlfep:wp490

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  1. Page, Frank Jr. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2003. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 63-109, February.
  2. David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine.
  3. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2008. "Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 456-481, April.
  4. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
  5. Paulo Monteiro & Frank Page, 2008. "Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 503-524, March.
  6. Michael Peters, 1999. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Working Papers, University of Toronto, Department of Economics peters-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
  7. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," CESifo Working Paper Series 581, CESifo Group Munich.
  8. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
  9. Simon, Leo K. & Zame, William R., 1987. "Discontinous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley qt8n46v2wv, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
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Cited by:
  1. Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Common Agency Games with Common Value Exclusion, Convexity and Existence," Working Papers, Department of Research, Ipag Business School 2014-420, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
  2. Ulrich Horst & Santiago Moreno-Bromberg, 2011. "Efficiency and Equilibria in Games of Optimal Derivative Design," Papers 1107.0839, arXiv.org.
  3. Andrea Attar & Thomas Mariotti & François Salanié, 2014. "On Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," CEIS Research Paper, Tor Vergata University, CEIS 314, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 18 Apr 2014.
  4. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 2012. "Representing equilibrium aggregates in aggregate games with applications to common agency," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 76(2), pages 753-772.
  5. Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 2009. "Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 664-678, September.
  6. Frank H. Page, Jr. & Paulo K. Monteiro, 2007. "Endogenous Mechanisms and Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Contracting," Caepr Working Papers, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington 2007-025, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.

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