Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection

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Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection

Author Info

Guilherme Carmona (Universidade Nova de Lisboa)
José Fajardo (IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro)

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Abstract

We establish the existence of sequential equilibria in general menu games, known to be sufficient to analyze common agency problems. In particular, we show that our result solves some unpleasant features of early approaches.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Economics Research Group, IBMEC Business School - Rio de Janeiro in its series IBMEC RJ Economics Discussion Papers with number 2006-05.

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Date of creation: 24 Oct 2006
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Handle: RePEc:ibr:dpaper:2006-05

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Paper
- Carmona, Guilherme & Fajardo, Jose, 2006. "Existence of Equilibrium in Common Agency Games with Adverse Selection," FEUNL Working Paper Series wp490, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Faculdade de Economia. [Downloadable!]

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
D89 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Other

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2006-10-28 (All new papers)
NEP-GTH-2006-10-28 (Game Theory)
NEP-MIC-2006-10-28 (Microeconomics)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Page, Frank Jr. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2003. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 63-109, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Page, F.H.Jr. & Monteiro, P.K., 2001. "Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," The Warwick Economics Research Paper Series (TWERPS) 592, University of Warwick, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
- Frank H. Page & Paulo Klinger Monteiro, 2002. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Game Theory and Information 0204001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
- Page Junior, Frank H. & Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2002. "Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 442, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
Simon, Leo K & Zame, William R, 1990. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(4), pages 861-72, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Leo K. Simon and William R. Zame., 1987. "Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules," Economics Working Papers 8756, University of California at Berkeley.
Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
Other versions:
- Michael Peters, 1999. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Working Papers peters-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Kreps, David M & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Sequential Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(4), pages 863-94, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- David M Kreps & Robert Wilson, 2003. "Sequential Equilibrium," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000813, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Frank H. Page, Jr. & Paulo K. Monteiro, 2007. "Endogenous Mechanisms and Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Contracting," Caepr Working Papers 2007-025, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington. [Downloadable!]

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