Centralization or Decentralization in Multi-Agency Contracting Games?
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington in its series Caepr Working Papers with number 2012-008.
Length: 40 pages
Date of creation: Nov 2012
Date of revision:
multi-agency; ex post equilibrium; mechanism design; menu design; revelation principle; delegation principle; relative information evaluation;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
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