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Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard

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  • Page, Frank H, Jr

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 2 (1992)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 265-81

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Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:2:y:1992:i:2:p:265-81

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Cited by:
  1. KLINGER MONTEIRO , Paulo & PAGE, Frank H. Jr., 1997. "Optimal selling mechanisms for multiproduct monopolists : incentive compatibility in the presence of budget constraints," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1997011, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Marcus Berliant & Frank H. Page, 2006. "Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(3), pages 409-451, 08.
  3. Page, Frank Jr. & Monteiro, Paulo K., 2003. "Three principles of competitive nonlinear pricing," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 39(1-2), pages 63-109, February.
  4. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger & Page, Frank Jr., 1996. "Non-linear pricing with a general cost function," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 287-291, September.
  5. Paulo Monteiro & Frank Page, 2008. "Catalog competition and Nash equilibrium in nonlinear pricing games," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 503-524, March.
  6. Monteiro, Paulo K. & Page Jr., Frank H., 2009. "Endogenous mechanisms and Nash equilibrium in competitive contracting games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(9-10), pages 664-678, September.
  7. Frank H. Page, Jr. & Paulo K. Monteiro, 2007. "Endogenous Mechanisms and Nash Equilibrium in Competitive Contracting," Caepr Working Papers, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington 2007-025, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  8. Page Jr., Frank H., 2008. "Catalog competition and stable nonlinear prices," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 44(7-8), pages 822-835, July.
  9. Yu Chen, 2013. "Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation," Caepr Working Papers, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington 2013-003, Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington.
  10. PAGE, Frank, 2000. "Competitive selling mechanisms: the delegation principle and farsighted stability," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2000021, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

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