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Budget Balancedness and Optimal Income Taxation

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  • Berliant, Marcus
  • Page Jr., Frank H.

Abstract

We make two main contributions to the theory of optimal income taxation. First, assuming conditions sufficient for existence of a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism, we show that if, in addition, agents' preferences satisfy an extended notion of single crossing called capacity constrained single crossing, then there exists a Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism that is budget balancing . Second, we show that, even without capacity contrained single crossing, existence of a , Pareto optimal income tax and public goods mechanism is guaranteed if the set of agent types contains no atoms.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences in its series Working Papers with number 1164.

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Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: May 2003
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published:
Handle: RePEc:clt:sswopa:1164

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Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
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Postal: Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125
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Keywords: optimal income taxation; budget balancedness; mechanism design; implementation;

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References

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  1. Mirrlees, James A, 1971. "An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(114), pages 175-208, April.
  2. Peter A. Diamond & J. A. Mirrlees, 1968. "Optimal Taxation and Public Production," Working papers 22, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  3. Myles,Gareth D., 1995. "Public Economics," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521497695.
  4. Hammond, Peter J, 1979. "Straightforward Individual Incentive Compatibility in Large Economies," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(2), pages 263-82, April.
  5. Page, Frank H, Jr, 1992. "Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 265-81, April.
  6. Artstein, Zvi, 1979. "A note on fatou's lemma in several dimensions," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 277-282, December.
  7. Konishi, Hideo, 1995. "A Pareto-improving commodity tax reform under a smooth nonlinear income tax," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 413-446, March.
  8. Berliant, Marcus & Page, Frank H, Jr, 2001. "Income Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods: Existence of an Optimum," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 771-84, May.
  9. Conley, John P. & Wooders, Myrna H., 2001. "Tiebout Economies with Differential Genetic Types and Endogenously Chosen Crowding Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 98(2), pages 261-294, June.
  10. Berliant, Marcus & Page, Frank Jr., 1996. "Incentives and income taxation: the implementation of individual revenue requirement functions," Ricerche Economiche, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 389-400, December.
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