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Corporate Diversification and Agency

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Benjamin E. Hermalin and Michael L. Katz.

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Paper provided by University of California at Berkeley in its series Research Program in Finance Working Papers with number RPF-291.

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Date of creation: 01 Jan 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ucb:calbrf:rpf-291

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Lewellen, Wilbur G, 1971. "A Pure Financial Rationale for the Conglomerate Merger," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 26(2), pages 521-37, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Morck, Randall & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1990. " Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(1), pages 31-48, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Hermalin, Benjamin E, 1993. "Managerial Preferences Concerning Risky Projects," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 9(1), pages 127-35, April.
    Other versions:
  4. William J. Marshall & Jess B. Yawitz & Edward Greenberg, 1984. "Incentives for Diversification and the Structure of the Conglomerate Firm," NBER Working Papers 1280, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kim, Son Ku, 1995. "Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 89-102, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1990. " Capital Structure and the Informational Role of Debt," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 45(2), pages 321-49, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Levy, Haim & Sarnat, Marshall, 1970. "Diversification, Portfolio Analysis and the Uneasy Case for Conglomerate Mergers," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 25(4), pages 795-802, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Diamond, Douglas W & Verrecchia, Robert E, 1982. " Optimal Managerial Contracts and Equilibrium Security Prices," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 37(2), pages 275-87, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Diamond, Douglas W, 1984. "Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 51(3), pages 393-414, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Hermalin, Benjamin E & Katz, Michael L, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Verifiability: The Effects of Renegotiation in Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 59(6), pages 1735-53, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Steven Shavell, 1979. "Risk Sharing and Incentives in the Principal and Agent Relationship," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 55-73, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1991. "Multitask Principal-Agent Analyses: Incentive Contracts, Asset Ownership, and Job Design," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 7(0), pages 24-52, Special I.
  13. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1983. "An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(1), pages 7-45, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Errunza, Vihang R & Senbet, Lemma W, 1984. " International Corporate Diversification, Market Valuation, and Size-Adjusted Evidence," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 39(3), pages 727-43, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. DeMarzo, Peter M & Duffie, Darrell, 1995. "Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting," Review of Financial Studies, Oxford University Press for Society for Financial Studies, vol. 8(3), pages 743-71. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Debra J. Aron, 1988. "Ability, Moral Hazard, Firm Size, and Diversification," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 19(1), pages 72-87, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Yakov Amihud & Baruch Lev, 1981. "Risk Reduction as a Managerial Motive for Conglomerate Mergers," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(2), pages 605-617, Autumn. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. James A. Mirrlees, 1976. "The Optimal Structure of Incentives and Authority Within an Organization," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 7(1), pages 105-131, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Bengt Holmstrom, 1979. "Moral Hazard and Observability," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 10(1), pages 74-91, Spring. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Nancy L. Rose & Andrea Shepard, 1994. "Firm Diversification and CEO Compensation: Managerial Ability or Executive Entrenchment?," NBER Working Papers 4723, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Perotti, Enrico C & von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig, 2003. "The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance," CEPR Discussion Papers 3914, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Tarun Khanna & Yishay Yafeh, 2002. "Business Groups and Risk Sharing around the World," CEI Working Paper Series 2002-8, Center for Economic Institutions, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University. [Downloadable!]
  4. Claessens, Stijn & Djankov, Simeon & Joseph P. H. Fan & Lang, Larry H. P., 1999. "Corporate diversification in East Asia : the role of ultimate ownership and group affiliation," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2089, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  5. Enrico Perotti & Ernst Ludwig von Thadden, 2004. "The Political Economy of Bank- and Market Dominance," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 04-012/2, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Felipe Balmaceda, 2002. "Corporate Diversification: Good for Some Bad for Others," Documentos de Trabajo 141, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile. [Downloadable!]
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