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Optimal income taxation with asset accumulation

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  • Abraham, Arpad
  • Koehne, Sebastian
  • Pavoni, Nicola

Abstract

Several frictions restrict the government's ability to tax assets. First of all, it is very costly to monitor trades on international asset markets. Moreover, agents can resort to non-observable low-return assets such as cash, gold or foreign currencies if taxes on observable assets become too high. This paper shows that limitations in asset observability have important consequences for the taxation of labor income. Using a dynamic moral hazard model of social insurance, we �find that optimal labor income taxes typically become less progressive when assets are imperfectly observed. We evaluate the effect quantitatively in a model calibrated to U.S. data.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by University Library of Munich, Germany in its series MPRA Paper with number 38629.

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Date of creation: 03 May 2012
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Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:38629

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Keywords: Optimal Income Taxation; Capital Taxation; Asset Accumulation; Progressivity;

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Cited by:
  1. Koehne, Sebastian & Kuhn, Moritz, 2013. "Optimal capital taxation for time-nonseparable preferences," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79951, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  2. Rodolfo G. Campos & Iliana Reggio, 2013. "Measurement error in imputation procedures," Banco de Espa�a Working Papers 1322, Banco de Espa�a.
  3. Sebastian Koehne & Moritz Kuhn, 2014. "Optimal Taxation in a Habit Formation Economy," CESifo Working Paper Series 4581, CESifo Group Munich.

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