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Decentralizability of Multi-Agency Contracting with Bayesian Implementation

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  • Yu Chen

    ()
    (Indiana University)

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    File URL: http://www.iub.edu/~caepr/RePEc/PDF/2013/CAEPR2013-003.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Center for Applied Economics and Policy Research, Economics Department, Indiana University Bloomington in its series Caepr Working Papers with number 2013-003.

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    Length: 20 pages
    Date of creation: Aug 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:inu:caeprp:2013003

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    Related research

    Keywords: multi-agency; Bayesian implementation; mechanism design; menu design; del- egation principle;

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    References

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    1. Page, Frank Jr., 1987. "The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 157-167, April.
    2. Frank Page & Paulo Monteiro, 2001. "Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 28(11), pages A0.
    3. Michael Peters, 1999. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Working Papers peters-99-01, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    4. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
    5. Han, Seungjin, 2006. "Menu theorems for bilateral contracting," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 131(1), pages 157-178, November.
    6. Page, Frank H, Jr, 1992. "Mechanism Design for General Screening Problems with Moral Hazard," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 2(2), pages 265-81, April.
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