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Common Agency with Informed Principals: Menus and Signals

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  • Simone Galperti
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    Abstract

    In this paper I consider games in which multiple informed principals simultaneously compete to influence the decisions of a common agent. I focus on the problem of characterizing the equilibrium outcomes of such games. I first show that, to solve this problem, one can invoke neither Myerson’s Inscrutability Principle, which holds in agency games with one informed principal, nor the Extended Taxation Principle, which holds in common-agency games with uninformed principals. I then provide two characterizations of the equilibrium outcomes: one for games in which the principals delegate the final decisions to the agent, and one for games in which they participate with the agent in making such decisions. JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D82, D83, D86

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    Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1541.

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    Date of creation: 06 Jun 2011
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    Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1541

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    Keywords: Common agency; informed principals; Inscrutability Principals; Extended Taxation Principle; menus; signals; direct mechanisms Principle; menus; signals; direct revelation mechanisms.;

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    1. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal: The Case of Private Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(2), pages 379-409, March.
    2. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February.
    3. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2011. "Reciprocal Relationships and Mechanism Design," Microeconomics.ca working papers gorkem_celik-2011-19, Vancouver School of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2011.
    4. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Working papers 397, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
    5. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
    6. Giacomo Calzolari & Alessandro Pavan, 2007. "Truthful Revelation Mechanisms for Simultaneous Common Agency Games," Discussion Papers 1458, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Larry Epstein & Michael Peters, 1996. "A Revelation Principle For Competing Mechanisms," Working Papers peters-96-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    8. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
    9. Martimort, David & Moreira, Humberto, 2010. "Common agency and public good provision under asymmetric information," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 5(2), May.
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