IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/ipg/wpaper/2014-49.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games

Author

Listed:
  • Gwenaël Piaser

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Gwenaël Piaser, 2014. "Incentive compatible mechanisms in multiprincipal multiagent games," Working Papers 2014-49, Department of Research, Ipag Business School.
    • Handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-49
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://faculty-research.ipag.edu/wp-content/uploads/recherche/WP/IPAG_WP_2014_049.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Peters, Michael, 2007. "Erratum to "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency": [Journal of Economic Theory 111 (2003) 88-109]," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 594-595, July.
    2. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-1372, September.
    3. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
    4. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
    5. Aumann, Robert J., 1974. "Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 67-96, March.
    6. Attar, Andrea & Piaser, Gwenael & Porteiro, Nicolas, 2007. "Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 590-593, July.
    7. Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2008. "Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 75-95, July.
    8. Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 333-337, June.
    9. Takuro Yamashita, 2010. "Mechanism Games With Multiple Principals and Three or More Agents," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 78(2), pages 791-801, March.
    10. Peters, Michael, 2003. "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-109, July.
    11. Partha Dasgupta & Peter Hammond & Eric Maskin, 1979. "The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 46(2), pages 185-216.
    12. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël & Rajan, Uday, 2010. "On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 376-380, January.
    13. Epstein, Larry G. & Peters, Michael, 1999. "A Revelation Principle for Competing Mechanisms," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 88(1), pages 119-160, September.
    14. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-498 is not listed on IDEAS

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:ipg:wpaper:2014-049 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2018. "On competing mechanisms under exclusive competition," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 111(C), pages 1-15.
    3. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenaël Piaser & Uday Rajan, 2012. "Competing mechanism games of moral hazard: communication and robustness," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 16(4), pages 283-296, December.
    4. ATTAR, Andrea & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & PIASER, Gwenaêl & PORTEIRO, Nicolàs, 2003. "Common agency games with separable preferences," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2003102, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2013. "Two-sided communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(1), pages 62-70.
    6. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2019. "Private communication in competing mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 183(C), pages 258-283.
    7. Seungjin Han, 2021. "Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games," Papers 2109.13177, arXiv.org, revised Aug 2023.
    8. Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2008. "Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 75-95, July.
    9. Galperti, Simone, 2015. "Common agency with informed principals: Menus and signals," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 157(C), pages 648-667.
    10. Hernández-Murillo, Rubén, 2019. "Interjurisdictional competition with adverse selection," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 173(C), pages 85-95.
    11. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Pavan, Alessandro, 2021. "Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms," TSE Working Papers 21-1227, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2023.
    12. Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenael Piaser, 2011. "Information Revelation in Competing Mechanism Games," CEIS Research Paper 205, Tor Vergata University, CEIS, revised 04 Jul 2011.
    13. Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Mariotti, Thomas & Piaser, Gwenaël, 2021. "Competing mechanisms and folk theorems: Two examples," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 125(C), pages 79-93.
    14. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2022. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Department of Economics Working Papers 2022-05, McMaster University.
    15. Sambuddha Ghosh & Seungjin Han, 2012. "Repeated Contracting in Decentralised Markets," Department of Economics Working Papers 2012-03, McMaster University, revised May 2013.
    16. Martimort David & Stole Lars, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-40, July.
    17. Seungjin Han & Siyang Xiong, 2023. "Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment," Papers 2309.11595, arXiv.org.
    18. Gwenael Piaser, 2004. "The Biais-Martimort-Rochet equilibrium with direct mechanisms," Game Theory and Information 0412007, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    19. Han, Seungjin, 2014. "Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 99(C), pages 85-95.
    20. Han, Seungjin, 2007. "Strongly robust equilibrium and competing-mechanism games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 610-626, November.
    21. ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwenaël & RAJAN, Uday, 2004. "Pure strategy and no-externalities with multiple agents : a comment," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2004050, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).

    More about this item

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ipg:wpaper:2014-49. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Ingmar Schumacher (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ipagpfr.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.