On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard
AbstractIn multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard, we provide sufficient conditions for the outcomes of pure-strategy equilibria in direct mechanisms to be preserved when principals can offer indirect communication schemes. The conditions include strong robustness in the direct mechanism game, as developed in the literature on competing mechanisms by Peters (2001) and Han (2007a), and a no-correlation property we define. We provide a rationale for restricting attention to take-it or leave-it offers, as is typically done in applications. We show via examples that it is necessary to allow direct mechanisms to be stochastic and to include private recommendations from principals to agents to preserve the corresponding equilibrium outcomes, and that the no-correlation condition is tight.
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Date of creation: 2007
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Moral hazard; multiple principal; multiple agent; direct mechanisms.;
Other versions of this item:
- Attar, Andrea & Campioni, Eloisa & Piaser, Gwenaël & Rajan, Uday, 2010. "On multiple-principal multiple-agent models of moral hazard," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 376-380, January.
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-05-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-BEC-2008-05-17 (Business Economics)
- NEP-CTA-2008-05-17 (Contract Theory & Applications)
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