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The Biais-Martimort-Rochet equilibrium with direct mechanisms

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  • Gwenael Piaser

    (University of Venice, Ca Foscari)

Abstract

In this note we show that the equilibrium characterized by Biais, Martimort and Rochet (Econometrica, 78, 2000) could have been characterized by using direct mechanisms.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0412/0412007.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0412007.

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Length: 12 pages
Date of creation: 10 Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0412007

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 12
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

Related research

Keywords: Common Agency; Revelation Principle; Direct Mechanisms; Nonlinear Prices;

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References

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  1. Eugenio J. Miravete, 2002. "Preserving Log-Concavity Under Convolution: Comment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(3), pages 1253-1254, May.
  2. Myerson, Roger B, 1979. "Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(1), pages 61-73, January.
  3. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 93-128, September.
  4. Berliant, Marcus & Page, Frank H, Jr, 2001. "Income Taxes and the Provision of Public Goods: Existence of an Optimum," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(3), pages 771-84, May.
  5. Peters, Michael, 2003. "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-109, July.
  6. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  7. Bruno Biais & David Martimort & Jean-Charles Rochet, 2000. "Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(4), pages 799-838, July.
  8. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
  9. ATTAR, Andrea & MAJUMDAR, Dipjyoti & PIASER, Gwenaêl & PORTEIRO, Nicolàs, 2003. "Common agency games with separable preferences," CORE Discussion Papers 2003102, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  10. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
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Cited by:
  1. Attar, Andrea & Mariotti, Thomas & Salanié, François, 2009. "Non-Exclusive Competition in the Market for Lemons," TSE Working Papers 09-055, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).

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