Weak Monotonicity Characterizes Deterministic Dominant-Strategy Implementation
AbstractWe characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent. Copyright The Econometric Society 2006.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 74 (2006)
Issue (Month): 4 (07)
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