This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Ideological uncertainty and lobbying competition

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Martimort, David
Semenov, Aggey

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

Polarized interest groups compete to influence a decision-maker through monetary contributions. The decision-maker chooses a one-dimensional policy and has private information about his ideal point. Competition between interest groups under asymmetric information yields a rich pattern of equilibrium strategies and payoffs. Policies are systematically biased towards the decision-maker's ideal point and it may sometimes lead to a "laissez-faire" equilibrium where the decision-maker is freed from any influence. Either the most extreme decision-makers or the most moderate ones may get information rent depending on their ideological bias. The market for influence may exhibit segmentation with interest groups keeping an unchallenged influence on ideologically close-by decision-makers. Interest groups refrain from contributing when there is too much uncertainty on the decision-maker's ideology and when the latter is ideologically too far away.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V76-4R40SJF-2/1/3768d1a5b48a048b573a3c6ff3cee0cc
File Format:
File Function:
Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Public Economics.

Volume (Year): 92 (2008)
Issue (Month): 3-4 (April)
Pages: 456-481
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:92:y:2008:i:3-4:p:456-481

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/505578

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Heidi Boesdal).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Kishore Gawande & Pravin Krishna & Marcelo Olarreaga, 2005. "Lobbying Competition Over Trade Policy," NBER Working Papers 11371, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  2. Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, 1999. "What Drives Deregulation? Economics And Politics Of The Relaxation Of Bank Branching Restrictions," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(4), pages 1437-1467, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Bradford, Scott, 2003. "Protection and jobs: explaining the structure of trade barriers across industries," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 19-39, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Grossman, Gene M & Helpman, Elhanan, 1994. "Protection for Sale," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(4), pages 833-50, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  5. Claudio Mezzetti, 1997. "Common Agency with Horizontally Differentiated Principals," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 28(2), pages 323-345, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Pinelopi Koujianou Goldberg & Giovanni Maggi, 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1135-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Elhanan Helpman & Torsten Persson, 2001. "Lobbying and Legislative Bargaining," Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 1(advances/), pages 1008-1008. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Martimort, David & Semenov, Aggey, 2007. "The pluralistic view of politics: Asymmetric lobbyists, ideological uncertainty and political entry," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 97(2), pages 155-161, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2003. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," Advances in Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1037-1037. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. David Martimort & Aggey Semenov, 2007. "Political Biases in Lobbying under Asymmetric Information," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 5(2-3), pages 614-623, 04-05. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Peters, Michael, 2001. "Common Agency and the Revelation Principle," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
    Other versions:
  12. David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Leonardo Felli & Antonio Merlo, 2006. "Endogenous Lobbying," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 4(1), pages 180-215, 03. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Lewis, Tracy R. & Sappington, David E. M., 1989. "Countervailing incentives in agency problems," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 49(2), pages 294-313, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Klemperer, Paul D & Meyer, Margaret A, 1989. "Supply Function Equilibria in Oligopoly under Uncertainty," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 57(6), pages 1243-77, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Devashish Mitra, 1999. "Endogenous Lobby Formation and Endogenous Protection: A Long-Run Model of Trade Policy Determination," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1116-1134, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Maggi G. & Rodriguez-Clare A., 1995. "On Countervailing Incentives," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 66(1), pages 238-263, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  18. Le Breton, Michel & Salanie, Francois, 2003. "Lobbying under political uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(12), pages 2589-2610, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Laussel, Didier & Le Breton, Michel, 2001. "Conflict and Cooperation: The Structure of Equilibrium Payoffs in Common Agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 100(1), pages 93-128, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Gawande, Kishore, 1997. "US non-tariff barriers as privately provided public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 61-81, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  21. Randall S. Kroszner & Thomas Stratmann, 1998. "Interest Group Competition and the Organization of Congress: Theory and Evidence from Financial Services' Political Action Committees," CRSP working papers 349, Center for Research in Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago.
    Other versions:
  22. Thomas Stratmann, 2005. "Some talk: Money in politics. A (partial) review of the literature," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 135-156, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Menu Auctions, Resource Allocation, and Economic Influence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 101(1), pages 1-31, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  24. Martimort, David & Stole, Lars, 1999. "Contractual Externalities and Common Agency Equilibria," IDEI Working Papers 110, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse, revised 2003. [Downloadable!]
Full references

Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? Authors registered on the RePEc Author Service receive monthly emails with details about downloads and abstract views of their works.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-7.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.