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Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment

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  • Vasiliki Skreta

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Paper provided by UCLA Department of Economics in its series UCLA Economics Online Papers with number 346.

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Date of creation: 28 Jan 2005
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Handle: RePEc:cla:uclaol:346

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Web page: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/

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References

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  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2000. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1521, Econometric Society.
  2. Evans, Robert & Reiche, Sönje, 2008. "Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: The multi-agent case with transferable utility," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(3), pages 611-614, June.
  3. Zheng, Charles Zhoucheng, 2002. "Optimal Auction with Resale," Staff General Research Papers 12664, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
  4. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
  5. Roger B. Myerson, 1977. "Incentive Compatability and the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 284, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Working Papers 08-10, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  7. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean., 1988. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Working Papers 665, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-75, September.
  9. Roger B. Myerson, 1981. "Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal," Discussion Papers 481, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  10. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2000. "Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 165-171, November.
  11. Robert H. Porter, 1992. "The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," NBER Working Papers 4185, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  12. Freixas, Xavier & Guesnerie, Roger & Tirole, Jean, 1985. "Planning under Incomplete Information and the Ratchet Effect," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 52(2), pages 173-91, April.
  13. R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1994. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions," Discussion Papers 1104, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  14. Skreta, Vasiliki, 2006. "Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 91(2), pages 293-299, May.
  15. Faruk Gul & Hugo Sonnenschein & Robert Wilson, 2010. "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," Levine's Working Paper Archive 232, David K. Levine.
  16. Caillaud, Bernard & Mezzetti, Claudio, 2004. "Equilibrium reserve prices in sequential ascending auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 117(1), pages 78-95, July.
  17. Maskin, Eric & Tirole, Jean, 1992. "The Principal-Agent Relationship with an Informed Principal, II: Common Values," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(1), pages 1-42, January.
  18. Roger B. Myerson, 1978. "Optimal Auction Design," Discussion Papers 362, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  19. McAfee, R Preston & Quan, Daniel C & Vincent, Daniel R, 2002. "How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids, with an Application to Real Estate Auctions," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 50(4), pages 391-416, December.
  20. Hart, Oliver D & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 509-40, October.
  21. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2001. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1077-98, July.
  22. L. Wade, 1988. "Review," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 58(1), pages 99-100, July.
  23. George J. Stigler, 1980. "An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 10, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
  24. Alessandro Acquisti & Hal R. Varian, 2002. "Contidioning Prices on Purchase History," Microeconomics 0210001, EconWPA.
  25. Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  26. Riley, John & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1983. "Optimal Selling Strategies: When to Haggle, When to Hold Firm," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(2), pages 267-89, May.
  27. Nancy L. Stokey, 1981. "Rational Expectations and Durable Goods Pricing," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 12(1), pages 112-128, Spring.
  28. Riley, John G & Samuelson, William F, 1981. "Optimal Auctions," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 71(3), pages 381-92, June.
  29. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "Optimal Auctions with General Distributions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000227, UCLA Department of Economics.
  30. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
  31. David McAdams & Michael Schwarz, 2007. "Credible Sales Mechanisms and Intermediaries," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 97(1), pages 260-276, March.
  32. Burguet, Roberto & Sakovics, Jozsef, 1996. "Reserve Prices without Commitment," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 149-164, August.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Hannu Vartiainen, 2013. "Auction Design Without Commitment," Journal of the European Economic Association, European Economic Association, vol. 11(2), pages 316-342, 04.
  2. Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2011. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 786969000000000025, David K. Levine.
  3. Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2009. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 814577000000000059, David K. Levine.
  4. Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Revenue Equivalence for Arbitrary Type Spaces," UCLA Economics Online Papers 347, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Robert Zeithammer, 2009. "Commitment in sequential auctioning: advance listings and threshold prices," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 187-216, January.
  6. Jenny Simon, 2011. "Financial Markets as a Commitment Device for the Government," 2011 Meeting Papers 447, Society for Economic Dynamics.
  7. Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2010. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Levine's Working Paper Archive 661465000000000279, David K. Levine.
  8. Lamping, Jennifer, 2008. "The Value of Commitment in Auctions with Matching," MPRA Paper 24373, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  9. Johannes Horner & Larry Samuelson, 2008. "Managing Strategic Buyers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1684R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Sep 2010.
  10. Chia-Hui Chen & Junichiro Ishida, 2013. "Auctions Versus Negotiations: The Role of Price Discrimination," ISER Discussion Paper 0873, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  11. Lu Ji & Tong Li, 2008. "Multi-round procurement auctions with secret reserve prices: theory and evidence," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 897-923.

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