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The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions

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Robert H. Porter

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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 1008.

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Date of creation: Sep 1992
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:1008

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987. "Auctions and Bidding," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Hendricks, K. & Kovenock, D., 1989. "Asymmetric Information, Information Externalities, And Efficiency: The Case Of Oil Exploration," UBC Departmental Archives 89-09, UBC Department of Economics.
    Other versions:
  3. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Paarsch, H.J., 1991. "Empirical Models of Auctions and an Application to British Columbia Timber Sales," UBC Departmental Archives 91-19, UBC Department of Economics.
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  6. R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1992. "Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions," Discussion Papers 977, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Hansen, Robert G, 1986. "Sealed-Bid versus Open Auctions: The Evidence," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 125-42, January.
  8. LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques & OSSARD, Hervé & VUONG, Quang, 1991. "Econometrics of First-Price Auctions," IDEI Working Papers 7, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
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  9. Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter & Richard H. Spady, 1989. "Random Reservation Prices and Bidding Behavior in OCS Drainage Auctions," Discussion Papers 807, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
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  10. Thaler, Richard H, 1988. "Anomalies: The Winner's Curse," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 191-202, Winter. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Libecap, Gary D & Wiggins, Steven N, 1985. "The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 690-714, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Quang Vuong & Sandra Campo & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003. "Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 179-207. [Downloadable!]
  2. Andy Cosh & Douglas Cumming & Alan Hughes, 2005. "Outside Entrepreneurial Capital," ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers wp301, ESRC Centre for Business Research. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ronald M. Harstad, 2007. "Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder?," Working Papers 0711, Department of Economics, University of Missouri. [Downloadable!]
  4. Grant, S. & Kajii, A. & Menezes, F. & Ryan, M.J., 2002. "Auctions with options to re-auction," Discussion Paper 55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Catherine D. Wolfram, 1997. "Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity," NBER Working Papers 6269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Seow Eng Ong, 2006. "Price Discovery in Real Estate Auctions: The Story of Unsuccessful Attempts," Journal of Real Estate Research, American Real Estate Society, vol. 28(1), pages 39-60. [Downloadable!]
  7. Vasiliki Skreta, 2003. "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000176, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  8. Sergei Izmalkov, 2004. "Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction," Working Papers 2004.91, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
  9. Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2007. "Information Value and Externalities in Reputation Building - An Experimental Study," Working Paper Series in Economics 35, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
  10. Dakshina De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005. "The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions," Microeconomics 0511011, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Shogren, Jason & Margolis, Michael, 2003. "Implementing the Efficient Auction: Initial Results from the Lab," Discussion Papers dp-03-63, Resources For the Future. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  12. Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999. "The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions," New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires 99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-. [Downloadable!]
  13. Atsushi Iimi, 2006. "Did Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse?," IMF Working Papers 06/138, International Monetary Fund. [Downloadable!]
  14. Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment," UCLA Economics Online Papers 346, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  15. Kenneth Hendricks & Joris Pinkse & Robert H. Porter, 2001. "Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions," NBER Working Papers 8294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  16. Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005. "Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  17. Matthew Shum, 1998. "The Econometrics Of English Auctions," Working Papers mshum-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  18. Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2003. "Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," NBER Working Papers 9836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Patrick Bajari & Robert S. McMillan & Steve Tadelis, 2003. "Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis," NBER Working Papers 9757, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Ken Hendricks & Rob Porter & Guofu Tan, 2000. "Joint Bidding in Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1763, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
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