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The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Dakshina De Silva (Texas Tech University)
Timothy Dunne (University of Oklahoma)
Anuruddha Kankanamge (University of Oklahoma)
Georgia Kosmopoulou (University of Oklahoma)
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registered author(s):
A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller’s valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state’s internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.
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Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Microeconomics with number
0511011.
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Length: 43 pages
Date of creation: 29 Nov 2005Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpmi:0511011Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 43Contact details of provider: Web page: http://129.3.20.41
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Keywords: Information Release ; Procurement Auctions ; Other versions of this item:
Article De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008.
"The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Find related papers by JEL classification: L0 - Industrial Organization - - General D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports :
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: De Silva, Dakshina G. & Jeitschko, Thomas D. & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2005.
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Jofre-Bonet, Mireia & Pesendorfer, Martin, 2000.
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Bulow, Jeremy I & Huang, Ming & Klemperer, Paul, 1996.
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CEPR Discussion Papers
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[Downloadable!] (restricted) Dakshina G. De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2003.
"An Empirical Analysis of Entrant and Incumbent Bidding in Road Construction Auctions ,"
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Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987.
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Econometrica ,
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Patrick Bajari & Lixin Ye, 2003.
"Deciding Between Competition and Collusion ,"
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Other versions: Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982.
"A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding ,"
Econometrica ,
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Other versions: Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993.
"Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June.
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Other versions: Campbell, Colin M. & Levin, Dan, 2000.
"Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions? ,"
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Koenker, Roger & Bassett, Gilbert, Jr, 1982.
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Harstad, Ronald M, 1990.
"Alternative Common-Value Auction Procedures: Revenue Comparisons with Free Entry ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
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Moulton, Brent R, 1990.
"An Illustration of a Pitfall in Estimating the Effects of Aggregate Variables on Micro Unit ,"
The Review of Economics and Statistics ,
MIT Press, vol. 72(2), pages 334-38, May.
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K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002.
"Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 92(3), pages 625-643, June.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2003.
"Competitive Bidding in Auctions with Private and Common Values ,"
Economic Journal ,
Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 598-613, 07.
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Other versions: Klemperer, Paul, 1998.
"Auctions with almost common values: The 'Wallet Game' and its applications ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 42(3-5), pages 757-769, May.
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Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H & Wilson, Charles A, 1994.
"Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1415-44, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H. & Wilson, Charles A., 1990.
"Auctions For Oil And Gas Leases With An Informed Bidder And A Random Reservation Price ,"
Working Papers
90-47, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
[Downloadable!] Hendricks, K. & Porter, R.H. & Wilson, C.A., 1990.
"Auctions for Oil and gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price ,"
UBC Departmental Archives
91-06, UBC Department of Economics.
Porter, Robert H, 1995.
"The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 63(1), pages 1-27, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
De Silva, Dakshina & Pagel, Beatrice & Peeters, Ronald, 2008.
"Sequential versus Simultaneous Auctioning of Procurement Contracts with Common Value and Private Value Components ,"
Research Memoranda
005, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2007.
"What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
marmer-07-11-22-02-26-44, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 22 Nov 2007.
[Downloadable!]
De Silva, Dakshina & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2007.
"The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions ,"
MPRA Paper
5236, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Hiroshi Ohashi, 2009.
"Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works ,"
Review of Industrial Organization ,
Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 267-285, May.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Dakshina G. De Silva & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005.
"The Impact Of Change In Auction Format On Bidding Behavior ,"
Microeconomics
0512009, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Miguel Amaral & Stéphane Saussier & Anne Yvrande-Billon, 2006.
"Does Competition for the Field Improve Cost Efficiency? Evidence from the London Bus Tendering Model ,"
Working Papers
2006-14, Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI).
[Downloadable!]
Laure Athias & Antonio Nuñez, 2006.
"Number of Bidders and the Winner’s Curse in Toll Road Concessions: An Empirical Analysis ,"
Working Papers
2006-16, Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI).
[Downloadable!]
Athias, Laure & Nunez, Antonio, 2008.
"The more the merrier? Number of bidders, information dispersion, renegotiation and winner’s curse in toll road concessions ,"
MPRA Paper
10539, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
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