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Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?

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  • Campbell, Colin M.
  • Levin, Dan

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 91 (2000)
Issue (Month): 1 (March)
Pages: 106-120

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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:91:y:2000:i:1:p:106-120

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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References

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  1. Robert B. Wilson, 1967. "Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 13(11), pages 816-820, July.
  2. Laskowski, Michael C. & Slonim, Robert L., 1999. "An Asymptotic Solution for Sealed Bid Common-Value Auctions with Bidders Having Asymmetric Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 28(2), pages 238-255, August.
  3. John G. Riley & William Samuelson, 1979. "Optimal Auctions," UCLA Economics Working Papers, UCLA Department of Economics 152, UCLA Department of Economics.
  4. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December.
  5. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H. & Wilson, Charles A., 1990. "Auctions For Oil And Gas Leases With An Informed Bidder And A Random Reservation Price," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 90-47, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
  6. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September.
  7. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  8. J. Riley & E. Maskin, 1981. "Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," Working papers 311, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  9. John H. Kagel & Dan Levin, 1999. "Common Value Auctions with Insider Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 67(5), pages 1219-1238, September.
  10. M. Weverbergh, 1979. "Note--Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed," Management Science, INFORMS, INFORMS, vol. 25(3), pages 291-294, March.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Ángel Hernando Veciana & Michael Tröge, 2005. "The Insider'S Curse," Working Papers. Serie AD, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) 2005-08, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
  2. Larson, Nathan, 2009. "Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 65(2), pages 430-460, March.
  3. Stephen Morris & Hanming Fang, 2004. "Multidimensional Private Value Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 North American Winter Meetings 174, Econometric Society.
  4. Trauten, Andreas & Langer, Thomas, 2007. "Information production and bidding in IPOs: An experimental analysis of auctions and fixed-price offerings," Working Papers 50, Competence Center Internet Economy and Hybrid Systems, European Research Center for Information Systems (ERCIS), University of Münster.
  5. Prüfer, J., 2008. "Semi-Public Contests," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center 2008-023, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
  6. De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008. "The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
  7. Daniel Quint, 2010. "Looking smart versus playing dumb in common-value auctions," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 469-490, September.
  8. Kim, Jinwoo, 2008. "The value of an informed bidder in common value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 143(1), pages 585-595, November.
  9. David Malueg & Ram Orzach, 2012. "Equilibrium and revenue in a family of common-value first-price auctions with differential information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 219-254, May.
  10. Erik R. Fasten & Dirk Hofmann, 2010. "Two-sided Certification: The market for Rating Agencies," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2010-007, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
  11. Deltas, George & Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard, 2001. "Auctions with an inexpert bidder," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 73(1), pages 35-42, October.

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