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A Correction to Uniqueness in 'Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information'

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Author Info

  • Juan Dubra

    (Universidad de Montevideo)

Abstract

In this note I show that there is a mistake in the proof of uniqueness in Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Milgrom and Weber’s seminal “Competitive Bidding and Proprietary Information” and provide a correct proof.

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File URL: http://128.118.178.162/eps/game/papers/0409/0409005.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by EconWPA in its series Game Theory and Information with number 0409005.

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Length: 7 pages
Date of creation: 06 Sep 2004
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:wpa:wuwpga:0409005

Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 7
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Web page: http://128.118.178.162

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Keywords: Auctions; Uniqueness; Asymmetric Information;

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References

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  1. Robert B. Wilson, 1967. "Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 13(11), pages 816-820, July.
  2. Paul Milgrom & Robert J. Weber, 1981. "The Value of Information in a Sealed-Bid Auction," Discussion Papers 462, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. M. Weverbergh, 1979. "Note--Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 25(3), pages 291-294, March.
  4. Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Richard & Milgrom, Paul R. & Weber, Robert J., 1983. "Competitive bidding and proprietary information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(2), pages 161-169, April.
  5. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H & Wilson, Charles A, 1994. "Auctions for Oil and Gas Leases with an Informed Bidder and a Random Reservation Price," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(6), pages 1415-44, November.
  6. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
  7. Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988. "An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Li, Jianpei, 2009. "Partnership Dissolution and Proprietary Information," MPRA Paper 12505, University Library of Munich, Germany.
  2. Jianpei Li & Yi Xue & Weixing Wu, 2013. "Partnership dissolution and proprietary information," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 40(2), pages 495-527, February.
  3. Prüfer, J., 2009. "Semi-Public Contests," Discussion Paper 2009-33, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  4. Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2006. "Information revelation in auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 57(2), pages 181-205, November.

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