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Common Value Auctions with Insider Information

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Author Info
John H. Kagel
Dan Levin

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Abstract

Bidding is studied in first-price common value auctions where an insider is better informed than other bidders (outsiders). As in symmetric information structure (SIS) auctions, inexperienced outsiders suffer from a strong winner's curse. Super-experienced bidders, who have largely overcome the winner's curse, satisfy the comparative static predictions of the theory (i) An insider increases average seller's revenue compared to SIS auctions, (ii) insiders make substantially greater profits than outsiders, and (iii) more rivals cause insiders to bid higher. Changes in insiders' bids are consistent with directional learning theory (Selten and Buchta, 1994).

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 67 (1999)
Issue (Month): 5 (September)
Pages: 1219-1238
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:5:p:1219-1238

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  1. repec:bep:thecon:v:6:y:2006:i:1:p:1304-1304 is not listed on IDEAS
  2. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2002. "The Amsterdam Auction," Microeconomics 0205002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  3. Glenn Harrison & John A. List, 2003. "Naturally Occurring Markets and Exogenous Laboratory Experiments: A Case Study of the Winner’s Curse," Framed Field Experiments 0030, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Tibor Neugebauer & Reinhard Selten, 2002. "Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse3_2003, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  5. Robert Slonim, 2005. "Competing Against Experienced and Inexperienced Players," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 55-75, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Jeffrey P. Carpenter & Glenn W. Harrison, 2005. "Field Experiments in Economics: An Introduction," Artefactual Field Experiments 0030, The Field Experiments Website. [Downloadable!]
  7. Wilfred Amaldoss & Teck-Hua Ho & Aradhna Krishna & Kay-Yut Chen & Preyas Desai & Ganesh Iyer & Sanjay Jain & Noah Lim & John Morgan & Ryan Oprea & Joydeep Srivasatava, 2008. "Experiments on strategic choices and markets," Marketing Letters, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 417-429, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Reinhard Selten & Klaus Abbink & Ricarda Cox, 2001. "Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse10_2001, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  9. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Virginia Economics Online Papers 347, University of Virginia, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  10. Alan Mehlenbacher, 2007. "Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations," Department Discussion Papers 0706, Department of Economics, University of Victoria. [Downloadable!]
  11. S. Müller, . "Auctions," Sonderforschungsbereich 373 2000-72, Humboldt Universitaet Berlin.
  12. Brit Grosskopf, 2003. "Reinforcement and Directional Learning in the Ultimatum Game with Responder Competition," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 141-158, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Reinhard Selten & Klaus Abbink & Ricarda Cox, 2005. "Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 8(1), pages 5-20, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  14. Jacob K. Goeree & Theo Offerman, 2000. "Efficiency in Auctions with Private and Common Values: An Experimental Study," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 00-045/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
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