IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/f/pca953.html
   My authors  Follow this author

Colin M. Campbell

Personal Details

First Name:Colin
Middle Name:M.
Last Name:Campbell
Suffix:
RePEc Short-ID:pca953
[This author has chosen not to make the email address public]

Affiliation

Department of Economics
Rutgers University-New Brunswick

New Brunswick, New Jersey (United States)
http://economics.rutgers.edu/
RePEc:edi:derutus (more details at EDIRC)

Research output

as
Jump to: Working papers Articles

Working papers

  1. Colin Campbell, 2005. "Let Them Burn Money: Making Elections More Informative," Departmental Working Papers 200512, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  2. Colin Campbell, 2003. "Implementation and Orderings of Public Information," Departmental Working Papers 200303, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
  3. Colin M. Campbell, 2002. "Blackwell's Ordering and Public Information," Departmental Working Papers 200206, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.

Articles

  1. Colin Campbell & Dan Levin, 2006. "When and why not to auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 583-596, April.
  2. Campbell, Colin & Carare, Octavian & McLean, Richard P., 2005. "Auction form preference and inefficiency of asymmetric discriminatory auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 86(1), pages 95-100, January.
  3. Colin Campbell & Gautam Ray & Waleed A. Muhanna, 2005. "Search and Collusion in Electronic Markets," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 51(3), pages 497-507, March.
  4. Colin Campbell, 2004. "Implementation and orderings of public information," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 9(1), pages 43-57, December.
  5. Campbell, Colin M., 2004. "Blackwell's ordering and public information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(2), pages 179-197, February.
  6. Campbell, Colin M. & Levin, Dan, 2000. "Can the Seller Benefit from an Insider in Common-Value Auctions?," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 91(1), pages 106-120, March.
  7. John H. Kagel & Colin M. Campbell & Dan Levin, 1999. "The Winner's Curse and Public Information in Common Value Auctions: Reply," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 325-334, March.
  8. Colin M. Campbell, 1999. "Large Electorates and Decisive Minorities," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 107(6), pages 1199-1217, December.
  9. Campbell, Colin M., 1998. "Coordination in Auctions with Entry," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 82(2), pages 425-450, October.

More information

Research fields, statistics, top rankings, if available.

Statistics

Access and download statistics for all items

Co-authorship network on CollEc

NEP Fields

NEP is an announcement service for new working papers, with a weekly report in each of many fields. This author has had 1 paper announced in NEP. These are the fields, ordered by number of announcements, along with their dates. If the author is listed in the directory of specialists for this field, a link is also provided.
  1. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2006-01-24
  2. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2006-01-24

Corrections

All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. For general information on how to correct material on RePEc, see these instructions.

To update listings or check citations waiting for approval, Colin M. Campbell should log into the RePEc Author Service.

To make corrections to the bibliographic information of a particular item, find the technical contact on the abstract page of that item. There, details are also given on how to add or correct references and citations.

To link different versions of the same work, where versions have a different title, use this form. Note that if the versions have a very similar title and are in the author's profile, the links will usually be created automatically.

Please note that most corrections can take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.