Implementation and Orderings of Public Information
AbstractWe explore the relationship between public information and implementable outcomes in an environment characterized by random endowments and private information. We show that if public signals carry no information about private types, then an exact relationship holds: a more informative public signal structure, in the sense of Blackwell, induces a smaller set of ex-ante implementable social choice functions. This holds for a large set of implementation standards, including Nash implementation, and Bayesian incentive compatibility. The result extends the notion, dating to Hirshleifer (1971), that public information can have negative value to an endowment economy under uncertainty.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Rutgers University, Department of Economics in its series Departmental Working Papers with number 200303.
Date of creation: 07 Feb 2003
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Implementation; Blackwell's Ordering; Information; Risk Sharing;
Other versions of this item:
- Colin Campbell, 2004. "Implementation and orderings of public information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 9(1), pages 43-57, December.
- D80 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Colin M. Campbell, 2002.
"Blackwell's Ordering and Public Information,"
Departmental Working Papers
200206, Rutgers University, Department of Economics.
- Edward E. Schlee, 2001. "The Value of Information in Efficient Risk-Sharing Arrangements," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(3), pages 509-524, June.
- Green, Jerry R, 1981. "Value of Information with Sequential Futures Markets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 49(2), pages 335-58, March.
- Marshall, John M, 1974. "Private Incentives and Public Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 64(3), pages 373-90, June.
- Bernhard Eckwert & Itzhak Zilcha, 2003.
"Incomplete risk sharing arrangements and the value of information,"
Springer, vol. 21(1), pages 43-58, 01.
- Eckwert, B. & Zilcha, I., 1999. "Incomplete Risk Sharing Arrangements and the Value of Information," Papers 13-99, Tel Aviv.
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