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When and why not to auction

Author

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  • Colin Campbell
  • Dan Levin

Abstract

Standard auctions are known to be a revenue-maximizing way to sell an object under broad conditions when buyers are symmetric and have independent private valuations. We show that when buyers have interdependent valuations, auctions may lose their advantage, even if symmetry and independence of information are maintained. In particular, simple alternative selling mechanisms that sometimes allow a buyer who does not have the highest valuation to win the object will in general increase all buyers’ willingness to pay, possibly enough to offset the loss to the seller of not always selling to the buyer with the greatest willingness to pay. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2006

Suggested Citation

  • Colin Campbell & Dan Levin, 2006. "When and why not to auction," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 27(3), pages 583-596, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:27:y:2006:i:3:p:583-596
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-004-0558-5
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Wang, Hong, 2017. "Analysis and design for multi-unit online auctions," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 258(3), pages 1191-1203.
    2. Anderson, Steve & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett & Singh, Nirvikar, 2004. "Buy it Now: A Hybrid Internet Market Institution," Santa Cruz Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt21d715v9, Department of Economics, UC Santa Cruz.
    3. Vlad Mares & Ronald Harstad, 2007. "Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 32(2), pages 399-410, August.
    4. Anderson, Steven & Friedman, Daniel & Milam, Garrett & Singh, Nirvikar, 2007. "Buy it now: A hybrid market institution," MPRA Paper 4322, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Francesco Angelini & Massimiliano Castellani, 2018. "Private pricing in the art market," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(4), pages 2371-2378.
    6. Yuen Leng Chow & Isa E. Hafalir & Abdullah Yavas, 2015. "Auction versus Negotiated Sale: Evidence from Real Estate Sales," Real Estate Economics, American Real Estate and Urban Economics Association, vol. 43(2), pages 432-470, June.
    7. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Selling to Intermediaries: Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 2064R, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University, revised Jul 2017.
    8. Nan Liu, 2021. "Market buoyancy, information transparency and pricing strategy in the Scottish housing market," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 58(16), pages 3388-3406, December.
    9. Hammond, Robert G., 2010. "Comparing revenue from auctions and posted prices," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(1), pages 1-9, January.
    10. Loyola, Gino, 2008. "Optimal takeover contests with toeholds," UC3M Working papers. Economics we083217, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía.
    11. Hanzhe Zhang, 2021. "Prices versus auctions in large markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 72(4), pages 1297-1337, November.
    12. Ravi Jagannathan & Ann E. Sherman, 2006. "Why Do IPO Auctions Fail?," NBER Working Papers 12151, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    13. Steven M. Shugan, 2005. "Marketing and Designing Transaction Games," Marketing Science, INFORMS, vol. 24(4), pages 525-530.
    14. Hammond, Robert G., 2013. "A structural model of competing sellers: Auctions and posted prices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 60(C), pages 52-68.
    15. Christopher Boyer & B. Brorsen & Tong Zhang, 2014. "Common-value auction versus posted-price selling: an agent-based model approach," Journal of Economic Interaction and Coordination, Springer;Society for Economic Science with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents, vol. 9(1), pages 129-149, April.
    16. Bergemann, Dirk & Brooks, Benjamin & Morris, Stephen, 2020. "Countering the winner's curse: optimal auction design in a common value model," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society, vol. 15(4), November.
    17. Dirk Bergemann & Benjamin Brooks & Stephen Morris, 2016. "Optimal Auction Design in a Common Value Model," Working Papers 085_2016, Princeton University, Department of Economics, Econometric Research Program..
    18. Gino Loyola, 2021. "Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 25(1), pages 1-32, June.
    19. Christopher N. Boyer & B. Wade Brorsen & James R. Fain, 2015. "Private‐Value Auction Versus Posted‐Price Selling: An Agent‐Based Model Approach," Intelligent Systems in Accounting, Finance and Management, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 22(4), pages 249-262, October.
    20. Vlad Mares & Mikhael Shor, 2003. "Joint Bidding in Common Value Auctions: Theory and Evidence," Game Theory and Information 0305001, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    21. Simon Stevenson & James Young, 2015. "The probability of sale and price premiums in withdrawn auctioned properties," Urban Studies, Urban Studies Journal Limited, vol. 52(2), pages 279-297, February.
    22. Peyman Khezr & Abhijit Sengupta, 2014. "Signalling quality with posted prices," Discussion Papers Series 532, School of Economics, University of Queensland, Australia.
    23. Habib, Michel A. & Ziegler, Alexandre, 2007. "Why government bonds are sold by auction and corporate bonds by posted-price selling," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 343-367, July.
    24. Mares, Vlad & Harstad, Ronald M., 2003. "Private information revelation in common-value auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 109(2), pages 264-282, April.

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