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Deciding Between Competition and Collusion Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Patrick Bajari
Lixin Ye
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May 2001 In many studies in empirical industrial organization, the economist needs to decide between several non-nested models of industry equilibrium. In this paper, we develop a new approach to the model selection problem that can be used when the economist must decide between models with bid-rigging and models without bid-rigging. We elicit from industry experts a prior distribution over markups across auctions. This induces a prior distribution over structural cost parameters. We then use Bayes Theorem to compute posterior probabilities for several non-nested models of industry equilibrium. In many settings, we believe that it is useful to formally incorporate the a prior beliefs of industry experts into estimation, especially in small samples where asymptotic approximations may be unreliable. We apply our methodology to a data set of bidding by construction firms in the Midwest. The techniques we propose are not computationally demanding, use flexible functional forms and can be programmed using most standard statistical packages.
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Paper provided by Stanford University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number
01008.
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Date of creation: May 2001Date of revision:
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Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)De Silva, Dakshina & Pagel, Beatrice & Peeters, Ronald, 2008.
"Sequential versus Simultaneous Auctioning of Procurement Contracts with Common Value and Private Value Components ,"
Research Memoranda
005, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization.
[Downloadable!]
Hiroshi Ohashi, 2008.
"Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works ,"
CIRJE F-Series
CIRJE-F-548, CIRJE, Faculty of Economics, University of Tokyo.
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Other versions: Elena Krasnokutskaya, 2004.
"Identification and Estimation in Highway Procurement Auctions under Unobserved Auction Heterogeneity ,"
PIER Working Paper Archive
05-006, Penn Institute for Economic Research, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania.
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Patrick Bajari & Garrett Summers, .
"Detecting Collusion in Procurement Auctions: A Selective Survey of Recent Research ,"
Working Papers
01014, Stanford University, Department of Economics.
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Rieko Ishii, 2007.
"Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: a Study of Paving Market in Japan ,"
Discussion Papers in Economics and Business
07-16, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics and Osaka School of International Public Policy (OSIPP).
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Dakshina G. De Silva & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005.
"The Impact Of Change In Auction Format On Bidding Behavior ,"
Microeconomics
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Susan Athey & Jonathan Levin & Enrique Seira, 2004.
"Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions ,"
Levine's Bibliography
122247000000000524, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Other versions: Rieko Ishii, 2008.
"Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: A Study of a Paving Market in Japan ,"
ISER Discussion Paper
0710, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
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Susan Athey & Philip A. Haile, 2006.
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Levine's Bibliography
122247000000001045, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Other versions: Saphores, Jean-Daniel & Vincent, Jeffrey R. & Marochko, Valy & Abrudan, Ioan & Bouriaud, Laura & Zinnes, Clifford, 2006.
"Detecting collusion in timber auctions : an application to Romania ,"
Policy Research Working Paper Series
4105, The World Bank.
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Dakshina De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005.
"The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions ,"
Microeconomics
0511011, EconWPA.
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Other versions:
De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008.
"The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Hongbin Cai & J. Vernon Henderson & Qinghua Zhang, 2009.
"China's Land Market Auctions: Evidence of Corruption ,"
NBER Working Papers
15067, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
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Tostao, Emilio & Chung, Chanjin & Brorsen, B. Wade, 2006.
"Integrating the Structural Auction Approach and Traditional Measures of Market Power ,"
2006 Annual meeting, July 23-26, Long Beach, CA
21244, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
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Susan Athey, 2005.
"Comparing Open and Sealed Bid Auctions: Theory and Evidence from Timber Auctions ,"
Theory workshop papers
658612000000000098, UCLA Department of Economics.
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Joseph E. Harrington, Jr, 2005.
"Detecting Cartels ,"
Economics Working Paper Archive
526, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics.
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Marmer, Vadim & Shneyerov, Artyom & Xu, Pai, 2007.
"What Model for Entry in First-Price Auctions? A Nonparametric Approach ,"
Micro Theory Working Papers
marmer-07-11-22-02-26-44, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 22 Nov 2007.
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De Silva, Dakshina & Kosmopoulou, Georgia & Lamarche, Carlos, 2007.
"The Effect of Information on the Bidding and Survival of Entrants in Procurement Auctions ,"
MPRA Paper
5236, University Library of Munich, Germany.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steve Tadelis, 2006.
"Bidding for Incomplete Contracts: An Empirical Analysis ,"
NBER Working Papers
12051, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Patrick Bajari & Stephanie Houghton & Steven Tadelis, 2004.
"Bidding for Incompete Contracts ,"
Working Papers
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Iwan Bos & Maarten Pieter Schinkel, 2009.
"Tracing the Base: A Topographic Test for Collusive Basing-Point Pricing ,"
Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers
09-007/1, Tinbergen Institute.
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