This file is part of IDEAS , which uses RePEc data
[ Papers |
Articles |
Software |
Books |
Chapters |
Authors |
Institutions |
JEL Classification |
NEP reports |
Search |
New papers by email |
Author registration |
Rankings |
Volunteers |
FAQ |
Blog |
Help! ]
The Role of Information in U.S. Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics Porter, Robert H
Additional information is available for the following
registered author(s):
This paper describes the U.S. offshore oil and gas lease sales conducted by the Department of the Interior since 1954. Several decision variables are discussed, including bidding for leases, the government's decision whether to accept the highest bid, the incidence and timing of exploratory drilling, and the formation of bidding consortia. Equilibrium models of these decisions that emphasize informational and strategic issues and that account for institutional features of the leasing program are analyzed and their predictions compared to outcomes in the data. Copyright 1995 by The Econometric Society.
To download:
If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the
proper application to
view it first. Information about this may be contained
in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read
the IDEAS help
file . Note that these files are not on the IDEAS
site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica .
Volume (Year): 63 (1995)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 1-27
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML ,
plain text ,
BibTeX ,
RIS (EndNote),
ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:63:y:1995:i:1:p:1-27Contact details of provider: Phone: 1 212 998 3820 Fax: 1 212 995 4487 Email: Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/ More information through EDIRC
Order Information: Email: Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).
Keywords: Other versions of this item:
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.: McAfee, R Preston & McMillan, John, 1987.
"Auctions and Bidding ,"
Journal of Economic Literature ,
American Economic Association, vol. 25(2), pages 699-738, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Hendricks, K. & Kovenock, D., 1989.
"Asymmetric Information, Information Externalities, And Efficiency: The Case Of Oil Exploration ,"
UBC Departmental Archives
89-09, UBC Department of Economics.
Other versions: Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993.
"Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-38, June.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions: Hendricks, Kenneth & Porter, Robert H, 1988.
"An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information ,"
American Economic Review ,
American Economic Association, vol. 78(5), pages 865-83, December.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Paarsch, H.J., 1991.
"Empirical Models of Auctions and an Application to British Columbia Timber Sales ,"
UBC Departmental Archives
91-19, UBC Department of Economics.
Other versions: R. Preston McAfee & Daniel Vincent, 1992.
"Updating the Reserve Price in Common Value Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers
977, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Hansen, Robert G, 1986.
"Sealed-Bid versus Open Auctions: The Evidence ,"
Economic Inquiry ,
Oxford University Press, vol. 24(1), pages 125-42, January.
LAFFONT, Jean-Jacques & OSSARD, Hervé & VUONG, Quang, 1991.
"Econometrics of First-Price Auctions ,"
IDEI Working Papers
7, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse.
Other versions: Kenneth Hendricks & Robert H. Porter & Richard H. Spady, 1989.
"Random Reservation Prices and Bidding Behavior in OCS Drainage Auctions ,"
Discussion Papers
807, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Thaler, Richard H, 1988.
"Anomalies: The Winner's Curse ,"
Journal of Economic Perspectives ,
American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 191-202, Winter.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Libecap, Gary D & Wiggins, Steven N, 1985.
"The Influence of Private Contractual Failure on Regulation: The Case of Oil Field Unitization ,"
Journal of Political Economy ,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 93(4), pages 690-714, August.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full
references Cited by : (explanations , Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile , click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
Ronald M. Harstad, 2007.
"Does a Seller Really Want Another Bidder? ,"
Working Papers
0711, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
[Downloadable!]
Grant, S. & Kajii, A. & Menezes, F. & Ryan, M.J., 2002.
"Auctions with options to re-auction ,"
Discussion Paper
55, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Catherine D. Wolfram, 1997.
"Strategic Bidding in a Multi-Unit Auction: An Empirical Analysis of Bids to Supply Electricity ,"
NBER Working Papers
6269, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Seow Eng Ong, 2006.
"Price Discovery in Real Estate Auctions: The Story of Unsuccessful Attempts ,"
Journal of Real Estate Research ,
American Real Estate Society, vol. 28(1), pages 39-60.
[Downloadable!]
Vasiliki Skreta, 2003.
"Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment ,"
Levine's Bibliography
506439000000000176, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Sergei Izmalkov, 2004.
"Multi-Unit Open Ascending Price Efficient Auction ,"
Working Papers
2004.91, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
[Downloadable!]
Gary E Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2007.
"Information Value and Externalities in Reputation Building - An Experimental Study ,"
Working Paper Series in Economics
35, University of Cologne, Department of Economics, revised 01 Aug 2008.
[Downloadable!]
Shogren, Jason & Margolis, Michael, 2003.
"Implementing the Efficient Auction: Initial Results from the Lab ,"
Discussion Papers
dp-03-63, Resources For the Future.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: Atsushi Iimi, 2006.
"Did Botswana Escape from the Resource Curse? ,"
IMF Working Papers
06/138, International Monetary Fund.
[Downloadable!]
Vasiliki Skreta, 2005.
"Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment ,"
UCLA Economics Online Papers
346, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
Levine's Bibliography
784828000000000604, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
Vincent Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2005.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper Series
2005-13, Department of Economics, UC San Diego.
[Downloadable!] Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2006.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000000256, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Vincent P Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Non-Equilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
Levine's Bibliography
321307000000001005, UCLA Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!] Vincent P. Crawford & Nagore Iriberri, 2007.
"Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner's Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions? ,"
Econometrica ,
Econometric Society, vol. 75(6), pages 1721-1770, November.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Matthew Shum, 1998.
"The Econometrics Of English Auctions ,"
Working Papers
mshum-98-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Ken Hendricks & Robert Porter & Guofu Tan, 2003.
"Bidding Rings and the Winner's Curse: The Case of Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions ,"
NBER Working Papers
9836, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ken Hendricks & Rob Porter & Guofu Tan, 2000.
"Joint Bidding in Federal Offshore Oil and Gas Lease Auctions ,"
Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers
1763, Econometric Society.
[Downloadable!]
Vasiliki Skreta, 2008.
"Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment ,"
Working Papers
08-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Quang Vuong & Sandra Campo & Isabelle Perrigne, 2003.
"Asymmetry in first-price auctions with affiliated private values ,"
Journal of Applied Econometrics ,
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 18(2), pages 179-207.
[Downloadable!]
Andy Cosh & Douglas Cumming & Alan Hughes, 2005.
"Outside Entrepreneurial Capital ,"
ESRC Centre for Business Research - Working Papers
wp301, ESRC Centre for Business Research.
[Downloadable!]
Dakshina De Silva & Timothy Dunne & Anuruddha Kankanamge & Georgia Kosmopoulou, 2005.
"The Impact of Public Information on Bidding in Highway Procurement Auctions ,"
Microeconomics
0511011, EconWPA.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions:
De Silva, Dakshina G. & Dunne, Timothy & Kankanamge, Anuruddha & Kosmopoulou, Georgia, 2008.
"The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions ,"
European Economic Review ,
Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 150-181, January.
[Downloadable!] (restricted) Matthew J. Clayton & S. Abraham Ravid, 1999.
"The Effect of Leverage on Bidding Behavior: Theory and Evidence from the FCC Auctions ,"
New York University, Leonard N. Stern School Finance Department Working Paper Seires
99-055, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business-.
[Downloadable!]
Kenneth Hendricks & Joris Pinkse & Robert H. Porter, 2001.
"Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions ,"
NBER Working Papers
8294, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
Rob Porter, 1999.
"Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First-Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions ,"
Working papers
99-19, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Kenneth Hendricks & Joris Pinkse & Robert H. Porter, 2003.
"Empirical Implications of Equilibrium Bidding in First--Price, Symmetric, Common Value Auctions ,"
Review of Economic Studies ,
Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(1), pages 115-145, January.
Grant, Simon & Kajii, Atsushi & Menezes, Flavio & Ryan, Matthew, 2003.
"Auctions with Options to Re-auction ,"
Working Papers
2003-15, Rice University, Department of Economics.
[Downloadable!]
Patrick Bajari & Robert S. McMillan & Steve Tadelis, 2003.
"Auctions Versus Negotiations in Procurement: An Empirical Analysis ,"
NBER Working Papers
9757, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
[Downloadable!] (restricted)
Access and
download statistics Did you know? Authors can create their own profile with links to their works on the RePEc Author Service .
This page was last updated on 2008-9-29.
This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics , College of Liberal Arts and Sciences , University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics .