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Mechanism design for arbitrary type spaces

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  • Skreta, Vasiliki

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 91 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Pages: 293-299

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:91:y:2006:i:2:p:293-299

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  1. Dirk Bergemann & Martin Pesendorfer, 2001. "Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1323, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
  2. Paul Milgrom & Ilya Segal, 2002. "Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 583-601, March.
  3. Krishna, Vijay & Maenner, Eliot, 2001. "Convex Potentials with an Application to Mechanism Design," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1113-19, July.
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Cited by:
  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2000. "Sequentially Optimal Mechanisms," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1521, Econometric Society.
  2. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers 08-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
  3. Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, 2007. "Abstract types and distributions in independent private value auctions," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 643, FGV/EPGE Escola Brasileira de Economia e Finan├žas, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil).
  4. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001789, UCLA Department of Economics.
  5. Vasiliki Skreta, 2007. "Optimal Auctions with General Distributions," Levine's Bibliography 843644000000000227, UCLA Department of Economics.
  6. Che,Y.-K. & Kim,J., 2004. "Collusion-proof implementation of optimal mechanisms," Working papers 4, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.

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