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Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case

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Author Info
Bester, Helmut
Strausz, Roland

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-4177NK6-8/2/2f291885dcd74aad2c0a7730b810947d
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 69 (2000)
Issue (Month): 2 (November)
Pages: 165-171
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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:69:y:2000:i:2:p:165-171

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  1. Vasiliki Skreta, 2008. "Optimal Auction Design Under Non-Commitment," Working Papers 08-14, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  2. Kohei Kawamura, 2008. "Inequality, Happiness and Relative Concerns: What Actually is their Relationship?," ESE Discussion Papers 182, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  3. Vasiliki Skreta, 2005. "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment," UCLA Economics Online Papers 346, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  4. Christian Langpap, 2008. "Self-Reporting and Private Enforcement in Environmental Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 40(4), pages 489-506, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Vasiliki Skreta, 2003. "Optimal Auction Design under Non-Commitment," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000176, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kohei Kawamura, 2007. "Constrained Communication with Multiple Agents: Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Public Good Provision," ESE Discussion Papers 166, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
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