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Personal Details

First Name: Roland
Middle Name:
Last Name: Strausz
Suffix:

RePEc Short-ID: pst3

Email:
Homepage: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/Professuren/vwl/mt
Postal Address: Spandauerstr 1 1078 Berlin Germany
Phone:

Affiliation

(in no particular order)

• Institut für Mikroökonomische Theorie (Institute of Microeconomic Theory)
  Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät (Faculty of Economics)
  Humboldt-Universität

  Location: Berlin, Germany
  Homepage: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/Professuren/vwl/mt
  Email:
  Phone: +49.30.2093.5676
  Fax:
  Postal: Spandauer Str., D-10178 Berlin
  Handle: RePEc:edi:imhubde (more details at EDIRC)

• Center for Applied Statistics and Econometrics (CASE)
  Humboldt-Universität

  Location: Berlin, Germany
  Homepage: http://www.case.hu-berlin.de/
  Email:
  Phone: +49(0)30-2093-5630
  Fax: +49(0)30-2093-5649
  Postal: Spandauer Str. 1, 10178 Berlin
  Handle: RePEc:edi:cahubde (more details at EDIRC)

• CESifo

  Location: München, Germany
  Homepage: http://www.cesifo-group.de/
  Email:
  Phone: +49 (89) 9224-0
  Fax: +49 (89) 985369
  Postal: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
  Handle: RePEc:edi:cesifde (more details at EDIRC)

• Sonderforschungsbereich 649: Ökonomisches Risiko (Collaborative Research Center 649: Economic Risk)
  Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät (Faculty of Economics)
  Humboldt-Universität

  Location: Berlin, Germany
  Homepage: http://sfb649.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/
  Email:
  Phone: +49-30-2093-5708
  Fax: +49-30-2093-5617
  Postal: Spandauer Str. 1,10178 Berlin
  Handle: RePEc:edi:sohubde (more details at EDIRC)

Works

Download all references for this author: available formats: HTML (with abstracts), plain text (with abstracts), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote), ReDIF

Working papers

1. Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2011. "The Benefits of Sequential Screening," Discussion Papers 363, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Krähmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2011. "The Benefits of Sequential Screening," CEPR Discussion Papers 8629, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
2. Robert C. Schmidt & Roland Strausz, 2011. "The Timing of Climate Agreements under Multiple Externalities," Discussion Papers 366, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
3. Roland Strausz, 2010. "Separating Equilibria with Imperfect Certification," Discussion Papers 324, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
4. Konrad Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2010. "Who Should Pay for Certification?," Discussion Papers 323, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Stahl, Konrad & Strausz, Roland, 2011. "Who should pay for certification?," ZEW Discussion Papers 11-054, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
   • Konrad O. Stahl & Roland Strausz, 2011. "Who Should Pay for Certification?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3365, CESifo Group Munich.
   • Stahl, Konrad O & Strausz, Roland, 2011. "Who Should Pay for Certification?," CEPR Discussion Papers 8190, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
5. Dongsoo Shin & Roland Strausz, 2010. "Hierarchical Structures and Dynamic Incentives," Discussion Papers 318, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
6. Ronald Strausz, 2010. "Mediated Contracts and Mechanism Design," Discussion Papers 322, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
7. Roland Strausz, 2009. "Monopoly Distortions in Durability and Multi-Dimensional Quality," Discussion Papers 271, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Strausz, Roland, 2009. "Monopoly distortions in durability and multi-dimensional quality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 333-335, December.
8. Daniel Krämer & Roland Strausz, 2009. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning," Papers 036, Departmental Working Papers.
   • Roland Strausz, 2011. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 1015-1041.
   • Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2010. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning," Discussion Papers 303, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
9. Roland Strausz, 2009. "Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-006, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
   • Roland Strausz, 2009. "Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation," CESifo Working Paper Series 2638, CESifo Group Munich.
10. Lydia Mechtenberg & Roland Strausz, 2009. "Migration of the Highly Skilled: Can Europe catch up with the US?," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-048, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
11. Roland Strausz, 2009. "The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2009-040, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
    • Roland Strausz, 2010. "The Political Economy of Regulatory Risk," CESifo Working Paper Series 2953, CESifo Group Munich.
12. Dan Sasaki & Roland Strausz, 2007. "Collusion and Durability," Papers 032, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Dan Sasaki & Roland Strausz, 2008. "Collusion and Durability," Discussion Papers 246, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
13. Daniel Kraehmer & Roland Strausz, 2006. "VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities," Papers 031, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Krahmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 192-196, February.
14. Roland Strausz, 2005. "Interim Information in Long Term Contracts," Discussion Papers 40, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Roland Strausz, 2006. "Interim Information in Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1041-1067, December.
15. Roland Strausz, 2005. "Optimal Information Revelation by Informed Investors," Discussion Papers 34, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
16. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society.
17. Strausz, R., 1995. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship," Discussion Paper 1995-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Strausz, Roland, 1997. " Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 497-518, December.
18. Strausz, R., 1995. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," Discussion Paper 1995-60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    • Strausz, Roland, 1997. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 337-57, July.
19. R. Strausz, 1995. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent- Relationship (REVISION)," Game Theory and Information 9510002, EconWPA, revised 03 Apr 1996.
20. Damme, E.E.C. van & Feltkamp, V. & Hurkens, J.P.M. & Strausz, R., 1994. "Politieke machtsverhoudingen," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-154405, Tilburg University.
21. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
    • Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Papers 2, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
22. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, . "Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants," Papers 005, Departmental Working Papers.
23. Roland Strausz, . "Planned Obsolescence and the Provision of Unobservable Quality," Papers 028, Departmental Working Papers.
24. Roland Strausz, . "Moral Hazard in Sequential Teams," Papers 001, Departmental Working Papers.
25. Roland Strausz & Kay Mitusch, . "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Papers 023, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2005. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 467-500, October.
    • Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2004. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Discussion Papers 24, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
26. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
27. Roland Strausz, . "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Papers 021, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 460-470, August.
    • Roland Strausz, 2004. "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Discussion Papers 27, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
28. Roland Strausz & Katrin Burkhardt, . "The Effect of Fair vs. Book Value Accounting on the Behavior of Banks," Papers 024, Departmental Working Papers.
29. Roland Strausz, . "Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal--Agent Models," Papers 020, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 306-314, May.
    • Roland Strausz, 2004. "Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal–Agent Models," Discussion Papers 26, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
30. Roland Strausz, . "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Papers 018, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Strausz, Roland, 2005. "Honest certification and the threat of capture," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 45-62, February.
    • Roland Strausz, 2004. "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Discussion Papers 25, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
31. Roland Strausz, . "Regulation in a Political Economy: An explanation of limited commitment of governments in the context of the ratchet effect," Papers 002, Departmental Working Papers.
32. Lydia Mechtenberg & Roland Strausz, . "The Bologna Process: How student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality," Papers 030, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Lydia Mechtenberg & Roland Strausz, 2008. "The Bologna process: how student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 109-130, April.
    • Lydia Mechtenberg & Roland Strausz, 2006. "The Bologna Process: How Student Mobility Affects Multi-Cultural Skills and Educational Quality," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-018, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
33. Roland Strausz, . "Getting to Know your Agent: Interim Information in Long Term Contractual Relationships," Papers 014, Departmental Working Papers.
34. Roland Strausz, . "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," Papers 022, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Roland Strausz, 2009. "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 845-870, 09.
    • Roland Strausz, 2007. "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship: Strategy and Structure National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
35. Roland Strausz, . "Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty," Papers 019, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Roland Strausz, 2007. "Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8, pages 107-121, 02.
36. Roland Strausz, . "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing," Papers 015, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Timing of verification procedures: Monitoring versus auditing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 89-107, January.
    • Roland Strausz, 2005. "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing," Discussion Papers 33, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
37. Roland Strausz, . "Mitigating Non-contractible actions by randomness," Papers 003, Departmental Working Papers.

Articles

1. Roland Strausz, 2011. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre-Project Planning," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 78(3), pages 1015-1041.
   • Daniel Krämer & Roland Strausz, 2009. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre--Project Planning," Papers 036, Departmental Working Papers.
   • Daniel Krähmer & Roland Strausz, 2010. "Optimal Procurement Contracts with Pre–Project Planning," Discussion Papers 303, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
2. Roland Strausz, 2011. "Regulatory Risk Under Optimal Monopoly Regulation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 121(553), pages 740-762, 06.
3. Roland Strausz, 2009. "Planned Obsolescence as an Incentive Device for Unobservable Quality," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 119(540), pages 1405-1421, October.
4. Roland Strausz, 2009. "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 845-870, 09.
   • Roland Strausz, 2007. "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship: Strategy and Structure National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Roland Strausz, . "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," Papers 022, Departmental Working Papers.
5. Strausz, Roland, 2009. "Monopoly distortions in durability and multi-dimensional quality," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 105(3), pages 333-335, December.
   • Roland Strausz, 2009. "Monopoly Distortions in Durability and Multi-Dimensional Quality," Discussion Papers 271, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
6. Daniel Krahmer & Roland Strausz, 2008. "Ex Post Private Information and Monopolistic Screening," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 8(1), pages 25.
7. Lydia Mechtenberg & Roland Strausz, 2008. "The Bologna process: how student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 15(2), pages 109-130, April.
   • Lydia Mechtenberg & Roland Strausz, . "The Bologna Process: How student mobility affects multi-cultural skills and educational quality," Papers 030, Departmental Working Papers.
   • Lydia Mechtenberg & Roland Strausz, 2006. "The Bologna Process: How Student Mobility Affects Multi-Cultural Skills and Educational Quality," SFB 649 Discussion Papers SFB649DP2006-018, Sonderforschungsbereich 649, Humboldt University, Berlin, Germany.
8. Roland Strausz, 2007. "Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8, pages 107-121, 02.
   • Roland Strausz, . "Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty," Papers 019, Departmental Working Papers.
9. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
   • Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Papers 2, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
   • Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
10. Krahmer, Daniel & Strausz, Roland, 2007. "VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 94(2), pages 192-196, February.
    • Daniel Kraehmer & Roland Strausz, 2006. "VCG mechanisms and efficient ex ante investments with externalities," Papers 031, Departmental Working Papers.
11. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Buried in paperwork: Excessive reporting in organizations," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 60(4), pages 460-470, August.
    • Roland Strausz, 2004. "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Discussion Papers 27, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Roland Strausz, . "Buried in Paperwork: Excessive Reporting in Organizations," Papers 021, Departmental Working Papers.
12. Roland Strausz, 2006. "Interim Information in Long-Term Contracts," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 15(4), pages 1041-1067, December.
    • Roland Strausz, 2005. "Interim Information in Long Term Contracts," Discussion Papers 40, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
13. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Deterministic versus stochastic mechanisms in principal-agent models," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 128(1), pages 306-314, May.
    • Roland Strausz, . "Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal--Agent Models," Papers 020, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Roland Strausz, 2004. "Deterministic versus Stochastic Mechanisms in Principal–Agent Models," Discussion Papers 26, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
14. Strausz, Roland, 2006. "Timing of verification procedures: Monitoring versus auditing," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 89-107, January.
    • Roland Strausz, 2005. "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing," Discussion Papers 33, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Roland Strausz, . "Timing of Verification Procedures: Monitoring versus Auditing," Papers 015, Departmental Working Papers.
15. Roland Strausz, 2006. "Ordinary Shares and Managers," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 87(1), pages 1-14, 01.
16. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2005. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 467-500, October.
    • Roland Strausz & Kay Mitusch, . "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Papers 023, Departmental Working Papers.
    • Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2004. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Discussion Papers 24, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
17. Strausz, Roland, 2005. "Honest certification and the threat of capture," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 23(1-2), pages 45-62, February.
    • Roland Strausz, 2004. "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Discussion Papers 25, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    • Roland Strausz, . "Honest Certification and the Threat of Capture," Papers 018, Departmental Working Papers.
18. Roland Strausz, 2005. "Bolton, P., and Dewatripont, M.:Contract Theory," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 86(3), pages 305-308, December.
19. Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Deterministic mechanisms and the revelation principle," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(3), pages 333-337, June.
20. Roland Strausz, 2001. "Mitigating Non-Contractability with Interim Randomization," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 157(2), pages 231-, June.
21. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2001. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1077-98, July.
22. Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2000. "Imperfect commitment and the revelation principle: the multi-agent case," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 69(2), pages 165-171, November.
23. Roland Strausz, 2000. "Regulation in a political economy: explaining limited commitment and the ratchet effect," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 1(3), pages 181-197, December.
24. Strausz, Roland, 1999. "Efficiency in Sequential Partnerships," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 85(1), pages 140-156, March.
25. Strausz, Roland, 1997. " Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 99(4), pages 497-518, December.
    • Strausz, R., 1995. "Collusion and Renegotiation in a Principal-Supervisor-Agent Relationship," Discussion Paper 1995-48, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
26. Strausz, Roland, 1997. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 64(3), pages 337-57, July.
    • Strausz, R., 1995. "Delegation of Monitoring in a Principal-Agent Relationship," Discussion Paper 1995-60, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

Chapters

1. Roland Strausz, 2007. "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," NBER Chapters, in: Entrepreneurship: Strategy and Structure National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
   • Roland Strausz, 2009. "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 18(3), pages 845-870, 09.
   • Roland Strausz, . "Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs," Papers 022, Departmental Working Papers.

NEP Fields

38 papers by this author were announced in NEP, and specifically in the following field reports (number of papers):

1. NEP-ACC: Accounting & Auditing (1) 2004-07-11
2. NEP-BEC: Business Economics (3) 2005-10-29 2005-10-29 2010-04-24
3. NEP-CDM: Collective Decision-Making (1) 2004-06-13
4. NEP-CFN: Corporate Finance (1) 2003-11-09
5. NEP-COM: Industrial Competition (4) 2005-10-29 2006-09-16 2008-10-07 2009-09-19
6. NEP-CTA: Contract Theory & Applications (7) 2009-01-31 2010-04-17 2010-04-24 2010-06-26 2010-08-28 2011-09-16 2011-11-07 Author is listed
7. NEP-EDU: Education (2) 2006-02-19 2006-04-08
8. NEP-EEC: European Economics (3) 2006-02-19 2006-04-08 2009-10-31
9. NEP-ENE: Energy Economics (1) 2009-08-22
10. NEP-FIN: Finance (3) 2003-11-09 2004-07-11 2005-10-29
11. NEP-HPE: History & Philosophy of Economics (1) 2003-09-24
12. NEP-HRM: Human Capital & Human Resource Management (3) 2006-02-19 2006-04-08 2009-10-31
13. NEP-IAS: Insurance Economics (1) 2000-12-19
14. NEP-IND: Industrial Organization (2) 2006-09-16 2009-09-19
15. NEP-KNM: Knowledge Management & Knowledge Economy (1) 2006-09-16
16. NEP-LAB: Labour Economics (1) 2009-10-31
17. NEP-LAW: Law & Economics (1) 2000-12-19
18. NEP-MIC: Microeconomics (6) 2005-10-29 2005-10-29 2006-09-16 2008-10-07 2009-08-22 2011-11-07 Author is listed
19. NEP-MIG: Economics of Human Migration (1) 2009-10-31
20. NEP-PBE: Public Economics (1) 2006-04-08
21. NEP-POL: Positive Political Economics (1) 2009-08-22
22. NEP-PPM: Project, Program & Portfolio Management (2) 2010-04-17 2010-06-26
23. NEP-REG: Regulation (4) 2004-06-13 2009-01-31 2009-08-22 2010-06-26
24. NEP-URE: Urban & Real Estate Economics (2) 2006-04-08 2009-10-31

Statistics

This author is among the top 5% authors according to these criteria:

1. Number of Distinct Works, Weighted by Number of Authors
2. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months
3. Number of Abstract Views in RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors
4. Number of Downloads through RePEc Services over the past 12 months, Weighted by Number of Authors

Most cited item

• Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2001. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle: The Single Agent Case," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 1077-98, July.

Most downloaded item (past 12 months)

• Roland Strausz & Katrin Burkhardt, . "The Effect of Fair vs. Book Value Accounting on the Behavior of Banks," Papers 024, Departmental Working Papers.

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Co-authorship network on CollEc

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