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Mediation in Situations of Conflict

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  • Kay Mitusch

    (Free University of Berlin)

  • Roland Strausz

    (Free University of Berlin)

Abstract

We study the effectiveness of mediators in situations of conflict. In a game of cheap talk a principal may employ a mediator whose task is to gather information and make non--binding proposals. We show that mediators facilitate information transmission and are helpful if and only if the likelihood of a conflict of interest is strictly positive but not too high. Mediation increases the amount of information that can be induced in equilibrium and is helpful when full information revelation is not feasible. The insights of this paper extend to general models of mechanism design with imperfect commitment of the contract designer.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0361.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0361

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  1. Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June.
  2. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-75, September.
  3. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, David K. Levine.
  4. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November.
  5. Roger B. Myerson, 1984. "Multistage Games with Communication," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 590, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  6. Forges, F., 1987. "Can sunspots replace a mediator ?," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 1987045, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Hart, Oliver D & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 509-40, October.
  8. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May.
  9. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers, Departmental Working Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers.
  10. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, . "Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants," Papers, Departmental Working Papers 005, Departmental Working Papers.
  11. V. Crawford & J. Sobel, 2010. "Strategic Information Transmission," Levine's Working Paper Archive 544, David K. Levine.
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Cited by:
  1. Krähmer, Daniel, 2002. "Delegation versus authority," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-26, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).

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