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Mediation in Situations of Conflict

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Author Info
Kay Mitusch (Free University of Berlin)
Roland Strausz (Free University of Berlin)

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Abstract

We study the effectiveness of mediators in situations of conflict. In a game of cheap talk a principal may employ a mediator whose task is to gather information and make non--binding proposals. We show that mediators facilitate information transmission and are helpful if and only if the likelihood of a conflict of interest is strictly positive but not too high. Mediation increases the amount of information that can be induced in equilibrium and is helpful when full information revelation is not feasible. The insights of this paper extend to general models of mechanism design with imperfect commitment of the contract designer.

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File URL: http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0361.pdf
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Paper provided by Econometric Society in its series Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers with number 0361.

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Date of creation: 01 Aug 2000
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Handle: RePEc:ecm:wc2000:0361

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  1. Hart, Oliver D & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 55(4), pages 509-40, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  2. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Matthews, Steven A. & Postlewaite, Andrew, 1989. "Pre-play communication in two-person sealed-bid double auctions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 238-263, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Forges, Francoise, 1988. "Can sunspots replace a mediator?," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 347-368, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, . "Mediators and Mechanism Design: Why Firms Hire Consultants," Papers 005, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
  6. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine & Eric Maskin, 1994. "The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information," Levine's Working Paper Archive 394, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  7. Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, . "Imperfect Commitment and the Revelation Principle," Papers 004, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
  8. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-75, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  9. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Myerson, Roger B, 1986. "Multistage Games with Communication," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(2), pages 323-58, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1990. "Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(4), pages 597-625, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  12. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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