1. Matthews, Steven A, 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 347-69, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Radner, Roy & Schotter, Andrew, 1987. "The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study," Working Papers 87-41, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Radner, Roy & Schotter, Andrew, 1989. "The sealed-bid mechanism: An experimental study," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 179-220, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Credible Neologisms in Games of Communication," Working papers 386, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
4. Farrell, Joseph & Gibbons, Robert, 1989. "Cheap talk can matter in bargaining," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 221-237, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons., 1988. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Economics Working Papers 8863, University of California at Berkeley.
   • Robert Gibbons & Joseph Farrell, 1988. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Working papers 482, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
5. Forges, Francoise M, 1986. "An Approach to Communication Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(6), pages 1375-85, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Forges, F., 1984. "An approach to communication equilibria," CORE Discussion Papers 1984035, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
6. Grossman, Sanford J. & Perry, Motty, 1986. "Perfect sequential equilibrium," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 97-119, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Wilson, Robert B, 1985. "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(5), pages 1101-15, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. John G. Riley & Richard Zeckhauser, 1980. "Optimal Selling Strategies:," UCLA Economics Working Papers 180, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
9. Myerson, Roger B. & Satterthwaite, Mark A., 1983. "Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 29(2), pages 265-281, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, 1981. "Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading," Discussion Papers 469S, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
10. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Universal Mechanisms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 58(6), pages 1341-64, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Forges, F., 1987. "Universal mechanisms," CORE Discussion Papers 1987004, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
11. Barany, I. & , ., 1987. "Fair distribution protocols or how the players replace fortune," CORE Discussion Papers 1987018, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
12. Forges, Francoise, 1990. "Equilibria with Communication in a Job Market Example," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 105(2), pages 375-98, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmstrom, 1986. "The Theory of Contracts," Working papers 418, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
14. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay., 1989. "Efficient Trading Mechanisms with Pre-Play Communication," Working Papers 693, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
2. Balinga, Sandeep & Sjostrom, Tomas, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Working Papers 3-01-2, Pennsylvania State University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 391749000000000005, www.najecon.org. [Downloadable!]
   • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2001. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Economics Working Papers 0007, Institute for Advanced Study, School of Social Science. [Downloadable!]
   • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjostrom, 2003. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Levine's Working Paper Archive 618897000000000766, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
   • Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sj–str–m, 2004. "Arms Races and Negotiations," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 351-369, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Mark Fey & Kristopher Ramsay, 2009. "Mechanism design goes to war: peaceful outcomes with interdependent and correlated types," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 233-250, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Hannu Vartiainen, 2009. "Auction Design without Commitment," Discussion Papers 44, Aboa Centre for Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Hannu Vartiainen, 2003. "Auction Design without Commitment," Working Papers 2003.24, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
5. Richard McAdams & Janice Nadler, . "A Third Model of Legal Compliance: Testing for Expressive Effects in a Hawk/Dove Game," Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy Working Paper Series yale_lepp-1029, Yale Law School John M. Olin Center for Studies in Law, Economics, and Public Policy. [Downloadable!]
6. Celik, Gorkem & Peters, Michael, 2008. "Equilibrium Rejection of a Mechanism," Micro Theory Working Papers gorkem_celik-2008-10, Microeconomics.ca Website, revised 06 Aug 2008. [Downloadable!]
7. Roland Strausz & Kay Mitusch, . "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Papers 023, Departmental Working Papers. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2004. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Discussion Papers 24, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2005. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict and Limited Commitment," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 21(2), pages 467-500, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2006. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000085, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Olivier Compte & Philippe Jehiel, 2009. "Veto Constraint in Mechanism Design: Inefficiency with Correlated Types," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 182-206, February. [Downloadable!]
9. Dino Gerardi & Leeat Yariv, 2003. "Putting Your Ballot Where Your Mouth Is: An Analysis of Collective Choice with Communication," UCLA Economics Working Papers 827, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 1998. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," IDEI Working Papers 81, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Jean-Jacques Laffont & David Martimort, 2000. "Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(2), pages 309-342, March.
11. Junichiro Ishida & Takashi Shimizu, 2009. "Cheap Talk with an Informed Receiver," ISER Discussion Paper 0746, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University. [Downloadable!]
12. R. Vijay Krishna, 2004. "Communication in Games of Incomplete Information: The Two-player Case," ESE Discussion Papers 125, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
13. Saran, Rene, 2007. "In Bargaining We Trust," Research Memoranda 049, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
14. Anton Suvorov & Natalia Tsybuleva, 2008. "Advice by an Informed Intermediary: Can You Trust Your Broker?," Working Papers w0121, Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR). [Downloadable!]
15. Kay Mitusch & Roland Strausz, 2000. "Mediation in Situations of Conflict," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0361, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
16. Murali Agastya & Flavio Menezes & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Cheap talk, Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing In Joint Projects," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000551, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Agastya, Murali & Menezes, Flavio & Sengupta, Kunal, 2007. "Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-19, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)