Cheap talk can matter in bargaining

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Cheap talk can matter in bargaining

Author Info

Farrell, Joseph
Gibbons, Robert

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Joseph Farrell

Abstract

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Publisher Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.

Volume (Year): 48 (1989)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 221-237
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Handle: RePEc:eee:jetheo:v:48:y:1989:i:1:p:221-237

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869

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Paper
- Joseph Farrell and Robert Gibbons., 1988. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Economics Working Papers 8863, University of California at Berkeley.
- Robert Gibbons & Joseph Farrell, 1988. "Cheap Talk Can Matter in Bargaining," Working papers 482, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Murali Agastya & Flavio Menezes & Kunal Sengupta, 2005. "Cheap talk, Efficiency and Egalitarian Cost Sharing In Joint Projects," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000551, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Agastya, Murali & Menezes, Flavio & Sengupta, Kunal, 2007. "Cheap talk, efficiency and egalitarian cost sharing in joint projects," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 60(1), pages 1-19, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Melissas, 2004. "Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information," Game Theory and Information 0405007, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Olivier Gossner & Nicholas Melissas, 2003. "Informational cascades elicit private information," Discussion Papers in Economics 03/6, Department of Economics, University of Leicester. [Downloadable!]
- Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Melissas, 2004. "Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information," CIG Working Papers SP II 2004-19, Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin (WZB), Research Unit: Competition and Innovation (CIG). [Downloadable!]
- Olivier Gossner & Nicolas Melissas, 2006. "Informational Cascades Elicit Private Information ," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 47(1), pages 297-325, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Barry Eichengreen & Fabio Ghironi, 2006. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," Center for International and Development Economics Research, Working Paper Series 1030, Center for International and Development Economics Research, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Barry Eichengreen and Fabio Ghironi., 1997. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," Center for International and Development Economics Research (CIDER) Working Papers C97-091, University of California at Berkeley.
- Barry Eichengreen & Fabio Ghironi, 1998. "European Monetary Unification and International Monetary Cooperation," International Trade 9804001, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
Jung, Hanjoon Michael, 2007. "Strategic Information Transmission through the Media," MPRA Paper 5556, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Oct 2007. [Downloadable!]
Archishman Chakraborty & Nandini Gupta & Rick Harbaugh, 2002. "Seller Cheap Talk in Common Value Auctions," Claremont Colleges Working Papers 2002-30, Claremont Colleges. [Downloadable!]
David Austen-Smith & Jeffrey S. Banks, 1998. "Cheap Talk and Burned Money," Discussion Papers 1245, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Alonso, Ricardo & Dessein, Wouter & Matouschek, Niko, 2006. "When Does Coordination Require Centralization?," CEPR Discussion Papers 5802, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Ronald G. Cummings & Laura O. Taylor, 1999. "Unbiased Value Estimates for Environmental Goods: A Cheap Talk Design for the Contingent Valuation Method," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(3), pages 649-665, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Saran Rene, 2007. "In Bargaining We Trust," Research Memoranda 049, Maastricht : METEOR, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization. [Downloadable!]
Siddiqi, Hammad, 2007. "Stock Price Manipulation: The Role of Intermediaries," MPRA Paper 6374, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
Ulrich Doraszelski & Dino Gerardi & Francesco Squintani, 2003. "Communication and Voting with Double-Sided Information," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1084-1084. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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