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On Modeling Cheap Talk in Bayesian Games

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  • Steven A. Matthews
  • Andrew Postlewaite

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File URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/992.pdf
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Paper provided by Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science in its series Discussion Papers with number 992.

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Date of creation: Aug 1992
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Handle: RePEc:nwu:cmsems:992

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Postal: Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science, Northwestern University, 580 Jacobs Center, 2001 Sheridan Road, Evanston, IL 60208-2014
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Web page: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/
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References

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  1. Blume, A. & Sobel, J., 1991. "Communication-Proof Equilibria in Cheap-Talk Games," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics 91-27, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
  2. Crawford, Vincent P & Sobel, Joel, 1982. "Strategic Information Transmission," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 50(6), pages 1431-51, November.
  3. FORGES, Françoise, . "Equilibria with communication in a job market example," CORE Discussion Papers RP -885, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  4. Matthews, Steven A, 1989. "Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 104(2), pages 347-69, May.
  5. Blume Andreas, 1994. "Equilibrium Refinements in Sender-Receiver Games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 64(1), pages 66-77, October.
  6. Rabin, Matthew, 1990. "Communication between rational agents," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 144-170, June.
  7. Seidmann, Daniel J., 1990. "Effective cheap talk with conflicting interests," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 445-458, April.
  8. Roger B. Myerson, 1986. "Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 691, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  9. David Kreps & Robert Wilson, 1998. "Sequential Equilibria," Levine's Working Paper Archive 237, David K. Levine.
  10. Steven A. Matthews & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & Andrew Postlewaite, 1990. "Refining Cheap-Talk Equilibria," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 892R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  11. Joseph Farrell, 1985. "Credible Neologisms in Games of Communication," Working papers 386, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  12. Palfrey, Thomas R. & Srivastava, Sanjay, 1991. "Efficient trading mechanisms with pre-play communication," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 17-40, October.
  13. Myerson, Roger B., 1982. "Optimal coordination mechanisms in generalized principal-agent problems," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 67-81, June.
  14. Blume, A., 1992. "Equilibrium Refinement in Perturbed Games and in Sender- Receiver Games," Working Papers, University of Iowa, Department of Economics 92-13, University of Iowa, Department of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. David Austen-Smith & Tim Feddersen, 2002. "Deliberation and Voting Rules," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1359, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.

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