Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions for Sender-Receiver Cheap-Talk Games
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Economic Theory.
Volume (Year): 76 (1997)
Issue (Month): 2 (October)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/inca/622869
Other versions of this item:
- Park, I.U., 1993. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distribution for Sender Receiver Cheap-Talk Games," Papers 269, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
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- Pimienta, Carlos, 2009.
"Generic determinacy of Nash equilibrium in network-formation games,"
Games and Economic Behavior,
Elsevier, vol. 66(2), pages 920-927, July.
- Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- In-Uck Park, 2000. "Cheap Talk Reputation and Coordination of Differentiated Experts," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1680, Econometric Society.
- Carlos Pimienta, 2007.
"Generic Finiteness of Outcome Distributions for Two Person Game Forms with Three Outcomes,"
2007-20, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Pimienta, Carlos, 2010. "Generic finiteness of outcome distributions for two-person game forms with three outcomes," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(3), pages 364-365, May.
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- Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2006. "Markov Perfect Equilibria in Repeated Asynchronous Choice Games," Levine's Bibliography 321307000000000560, UCLA Department of Economics.
- Litan, Cristian M. & Marhuenda, Francisco, 2012. "Determinacy of equilibrium outcome distributions for zero sum and common utility games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 115(2), pages 152-154.
- Francesco De Sinopoli & Carlos Pimienta, 2009.
"Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria,"
2009-05, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
- Adrian de Groot Ruiz & Theo Offerman & Sander Onderstal, 2011. "Equilibrium Selection in Cheap Talk Games: ACDC rocks when Other Criteria remain silent," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-037/1, Tinbergen Institute, revised 31 Oct 2011.
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