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Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria

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Author Info
Francesco De Sinopoli () (Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Universita degli Studi di Verona)
Carlos Pimienta () (School of Economics, The University of New South Wales)

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Abstract

We prove that for generic network-formation games where players incur some strictly positive cost to propose links the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all Nash equilibria are regular and, therefore, stable sets.

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File URL: http://research.economics.unsw.edu.au/RePEc/papers/2009-05.pdf
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by School of Economics, The University of New South Wales in its series Discussion Papers with number 2009-05.

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Length: 9 pages
Date of creation: Jun 2009
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:swe:wpaper:2009-05

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Related research
Keywords: Network-formation games; Regular equilibrium; Stable sets;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C62 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Mathematical Methods and Programming - - - Existence and Stability Conditions of Equilibrium
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation

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This page was last updated on 2009-11-6.

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