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On the Generic Strategic Stability of Nash Equilibria if Voting is Costly

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Author Info

  • Francesco De Sinopoli

    ()
    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics)

  • Giovanna Iannantuoni

    ()
    (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Economics)

Abstract

We prove that for generic plurality games with positive cost of voting, the number of Nash equilibria is finite. Furthermore all the equilibria are regular, hence stable sets as singletons.

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File URL: ftp://www.ceistorvergata.it/repec/rpaper/No-41-DeSinopoli,Iannantuoni.pdf
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Tor Vergata University, CEIS in its series CEIS Research Paper with number 41.

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Length: 12
Date of creation: 08 Dec 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:rtv:ceisrp:41

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Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
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Web page: http://www.ceistorvergata.it
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Postal: CEIS - Centre for Economic and International Studies - Faculty of Economics - University of Rome "Tor Vergata" - Via Columbia, 2 00133 Roma
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Web: http://www.ceistorvergata.it

Related research

Keywords: Plurality Rule; Regular Equilibria; Stable Sets;

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References

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  1. De Sinopoli, Francesco, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcomes in Plurality Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 270-286, February.
  2. Lawrence E. Blume & William R. Zame, 1993. "The Algebraic Geometry of Perfect and Sequential Equilibrium," Game Theory and Information 9309001, EconWPA.
  3. Govindan, S & McLennan, A, 1997. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Papers 299, Minnesota - Center for Economic Research.
  4. Mertens, J.-F., 1988. "Stable equilibria - a reformulation," CORE Discussion Papers 1988038, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Marco A. Haan & Peter Kooreman, 2003. "How majorities can lose the election Another voting paradox," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 20(3), pages 509-522, 06.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Francesco De Sinopoli & Carlos Pimienta, 2009. "Costly Network Formation and Regular Equilibria," Discussion Papers 2009-05, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  2. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2007. "On participation games with complete information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 35(3), pages 337-352, February.
  3. Tasos Kalandrakis, 2009. "Robust rational turnout," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 41(2), pages 317-343, November.
  4. Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Finiteness of Outcome Distributions for Two Person Game Forms with Three Outcomes," Discussion Papers 2007-20, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.
  5. Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On Asymmetric Behaviors If Voting Is Costly," Economics Working Papers we053320, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía.
  6. Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.

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