On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms

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On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms

Author Info

Govindan, S
McLennan, A

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Andrew McLennan

Abstract

This working paper is about the generic finiteness of equilibrium outcome distributions in game forms.

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Paper provided by Minnesota - Center for Economic Research in its series Papers with number 299.

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Length: 20 pages
Date of creation: 1997
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:minner:299

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Keywords: ECONOMETRICS;

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Article
- Govindan, Srihari & McLennan, Andrew, 2001. "On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(2), pages 455-71, March.

Find related papers by JEL classification:
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

Cited by:
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Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Determinacy of Nash Equilibrium in Network Formation Games," Discussion Papers 2007-31, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]
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DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1998. "Two results about generic non cooperative voting games with plurality rule," CORE Discussion Papers 1998034, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Francesco De Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2002. "On The Generic Strategic Stability Of Nash Equilibria If Voting Is Costly," Economics Working Papers we025620, Universidad Carlos III, Departamento de Economía. [Downloadable!]
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- Francesco Sinopoli & Giovanna Iannantuoni, 2005. "On the generic strategic stability of Nash equilibria if voting is costly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 477-486, 02. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andreu Mas-Colell, 2008. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Payoffs for Bimatrix Games," Economics Working Papers 1103, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
In-Uck Park, 1993. "Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Sender-Received Cheap-Talk Games," Game Theory and Information 9310002, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
DE SINOPOLI, Francesco, 1999. "Further remarks on strategic stability in plurality games," CORE Discussion Papers 1999030, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 1999. "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Game Theory and Information 9901003, EconWPA, revised 03 Jun 1999. [Downloadable!]
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- Hans Haller & Roger Lagunoff, 2000. "Genericity and Markovian Behavior in Stochastic Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1231-1248, September.
Carlos Pimienta, 2007. "Generic Finiteness of Outcome Distributions for Two Person Game Forms with Three Outcomes," Discussion Papers 2007-20, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales. [Downloadable!]

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