Network formation with closeness incentives

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Network formation with closeness incentives

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Berno Buechel () (Institute of Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University)

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Berno Büchel

Abstract

We study network formation in a strategic setting where every agent strives for short paths to the other agents. The main parameter of our model is the marginal rate of substitution between network benefits and linking costs. We provide boundaries of stable networks for increasing and decreasing marginal returns. The formulated model stands in strong relation to the famous connections model (Jackson and Wolinsky ‘96): we show that for certain parameter values both models induce the same network structures.

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Paper provided by Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics in its series Working Papers with number 395.

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Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bie:wpaper:395

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D85 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Network Formation
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Venkatesh Bala & Sanjeev Goyal, 2000. "A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 68(5), pages 1181-1230, September.
Sanjeev Goyal & Sumit Joshi, 2006. "Unequal connections," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 319-349, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Jackson, Matthew O. & Wolinsky, Asher, 1996. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 44-74, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1995. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
- Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
Goyal, Sanjeev & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2007. "Structural holes in social networks," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 137(1), pages 460-492, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Jurjen Kamphorst, 2003. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Economics Discussion Papers 562, University of Essex, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal, 2002. "Network Formation with Heterogeneous Players," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 02-069/1, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
- Galeotti, Andrea & Goyal, Sanjeev & Kamphorst, Jurjen, 2006. "Network formation with heterogeneous players," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 353-372, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

Berno Buechel & Tim Hellmann, 2008. "Under-connected and over-connected networks," Working Papers 400, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Tim Hellmann & Berno Buechel, 2009. "Under-connected and Over-connected Networks," Working Papers 2009.38, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei. [Downloadable!]
Kris De Jaegher & Jurjen Kamphorst, 2008. "Network formation with decreasing marginal benefits of information," Working Papers 08-16, Utrecht School of Economics. [Downloadable!]
Berno Buechel & Vincent Buskens, 2008. "The dynamics of closeness and betweenness," Working Papers 398, Bielefeld University, Institute of Mathematical Economics. [Downloadable!]

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