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Definitions of equilibrium in network formation games

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  • Francis Bloch

    ()

  • Matthew Jackson

    ()

Abstract

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File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00182-006-0022-9
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Springer in its journal International Journal of Game Theory.

Volume (Year): 34 (2006)
Issue (Month): 3 (October)
Pages: 305-318

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Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:34:y:2006:i:3:p:305-318

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Related research

Keywords: Networks; Network games; Game theory; Equilibrium; Side payments; Transfers; Bargaining; D85; C71; C72; L14; Z13;

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References

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  1. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2003. "The Role of Trust in Costly Network Formation," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2003-53, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Matthew O. Jackson & Asher Wolinsky, 1994. "A Strategic Model of Social and Economic Networks," Discussion Papers, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science 1098, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
  3. Bloch, Francis & Jackson, Matthew, 2004. "The Formation of Networks with Transfers among Players," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1194, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Matthew O. Jackson, 2001. "Strongly Stable Networks," University of Oregon Economics Department Working Papers, University of Oregon Economics Department 2001-3, University of Oregon Economics Department, revised 15 Nov 2002.
  5. Gilles, R.P. & Sarangi, S., 2004. "Social Network Formation with Consent," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 2004-70, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. MUTUSWAMI, Suresh & WINTER, Eyal, 2000. "Subscription mechanisms for network formation," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2000020, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  7. Slikker, M. & Nouweland, C.G.A.M. van den, 1997. "A One-Stage Model of Link Formation and Payoff Division," Discussion Paper, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research 1997-23, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Tim Hellmann, 2013. "On the existence and uniqueness of pairwise stable networks," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 42(1), pages 211-237, February.
  2. Filippo Vergara Caffarelli, 2009. "Networks with decreasing returns to linking," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers), Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area 734, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
  3. Berno Buechel & Tim Hellmann, 2008. "Under-connected and over-connected networks," Working Papers 400, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  4. Matthew O. Jackson & Stephen Nei, 2014. "Networks of Military Alliances, Wars, and International Trade," Working Papers 2014.46, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  5. Tim Hellmann & Jakob Landwehr, 2014. "Stable Networks in Homogeneous Societies," Working Papers 517, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  6. Tim Hellmann & Mathias Staudigl, 2012. "Evolution of social networks," Working Papers 470, Bielefeld University, Center for Mathematical Economics.
  7. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Rahmi İlkılıç, 2009. "Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 51-79, March.
  8. Emiliya Lazarova & Peter Borm & Bas Velzen, 2011. "Coalitional games and contracts based on individual deviations," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 507-520, December.
  9. Palsule-Desai, Omkar D. & Tirupati, Devanath & Chandra, Pankaj, 2013. "Stability issues in supply chain networks: Implications for coordination mechanisms," International Journal of Production Economics, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 142(1), pages 179-193.
  10. Edoardo Gallo, 2009. "Small World Networks with Segregation Patterns and Brokers," Working Papers 2009.34, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
  11. König, Michael D. & Battiston, Stefano & Napoletano, Mauro & Schweitzer, Frank, 2012. "The efficiency and stability of R&D networks," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 75(2), pages 694-713.
  12. Yasuhiro Shirata, 2011. "Formation of Decentralized Manufacturer-Supplier Networked Market," Global COE Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series gd11-186, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
  13. Marco Marini, 2007. "An Overview of Coalition & Network Formation Models for Economic Applications," Working Papers 0712, University of Urbino Carlo Bo, Department of Economics, Society & Politics - Scientific Committee - L. Stefanini & G. Travaglini, revised 2007.
  14. Sumit Joshi & Poorvi Vora, 2013. "Weak and strong multimarket bidding rings," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 53(3), pages 657-696, August.
  15. Marco A. Marini, 2007. "An Overview of Coalitions and Networks Formation Models for Economic Applications," Working Papers 0707, CREI Università degli Studi Roma Tre, revised 2007.
  16. Daniel Huppmann & Jonas Egerer, 2014. "National-Strategic Investment in European Power Transmission Capacity," Discussion Papers of DIW Berlin 1379, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research.

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