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Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspectives

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  • Currarini, Sergio
  • Marchiori, Carmen
  • Tavoni, Alessandro

Abstract

Recent research in the field of network economics has shown how explicitly modelling the network structure of social and economic relations can provide significant theoretical insights, as well as account for previously unexplained empirical evidence. Despite their critical importance to many environmental problems, network structures and dynamics have been largely disregarded by the environmental economics literature. This paper aims to begin to fill this gap by analyzing how networks can provide new insights for both theory and practice, and identifying several avenues for future research. The paper addresses questions pertaining to a wide range of issues, including the adoption and diffusion of green technologies, access to and distribution of natural resources, common-pool resource management and governance, and the stability of international environmental coalitions.

Suggested Citation

  • Currarini, Sergio & Marchiori, Carmen & Tavoni, Alessandro, 2014. "Network Economics and the Environment: Insights and Perspectives," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 163615, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    • Handle: RePEc:ags:feemcl:163615
    DOI: 10.22004/ag.econ.163615
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    2. Giorgio Fabbri & Silvia Faggian & Giuseppe Freni, 2022. "On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks: an extended version," Working Papers 2022:03, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
    3. Müller-Hansen, Finn & Heitzig, Jobst & Donges, Jonathan & Cardoso, Manoel F. & Dalla-Nora, Eloi L. & Andrade, Pedro R. & Kurths, Jürgen & Thonicke, Kirsten, 2019. "Can intensification of cattle ranching reduce deforestation in the Amazon? Insights from an agent-based social-ecological model," SocArXiv x5q9j, Center for Open Science.
    4. Fabbri, Giorgio & Faggian, Silvia & Freni, Giuseppe, 0. "On competition for spatially distributed resources in networks," Theoretical Economics, Econometric Society.
    5. Jewell, Jessica & Vetier, Marta & Garcia-Cabrera, Daniel, 2019. "The international technological nuclear cooperation landscape: A new dataset and network analysis," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 128(C), pages 838-852.
    6. Efthymia Kyriakopoulou & Anastasios Xepapadeas, 2021. "Natural Resource Management: A Network Perspective," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 80(2), pages 221-256, October.
    7. Min, Yong & Du, Yuchen & Jin, Cheng, 2018. "The effect of link rewiring on a coevolutionary common pool resource game," Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, Elsevier, vol. 512(C), pages 935-944.
    8. Vasquez Caballero, Smit & Salgueiro-Otero, Diego & Ojea, Elena, 2023. "The Role of Catch Portfolios in Characterizing Species' Economic Linkages and Fishers' Responses to Climate Change Impacts," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 205(C).
    9. Müller-Hansen, Finn & Heitzig, Jobst & Donges, Jonathan F. & Cardoso, Manoel F. & Dalla-Nora, Eloi L. & Andrade, Pedro & Kurths, Jürgen & Thonicke, Kirsten, 2019. "Can Intensification of Cattle Ranching Reduce Deforestation in the Amazon? Insights From an Agent-based Social-Ecological Model," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 159(C), pages 198-211.
    10. Günther, Michael & Hellmann, Tim, 2015. "Local and Global Pollution and International Environmental Agreements in a Network Approach," Center for Mathematical Economics Working Papers 545, Center for Mathematical Economics, Bielefeld University.
    11. Günther, Michael & Hellmann, Tim, 2017. "International environmental agreements for local and global pollution," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 38-58.

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    Keywords

    Environmental Economics and Policy;

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    • N0 - Economic History - - General

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