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Network Games

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  • Andrea Galeotti
  • Sanjeev Goyal
  • Matthew O. Jackson
  • Fernando Vega-Redondo
  • Leeat Yariv

Abstract

In contexts ranging from public goods provision to information collection, a player's well-being depends on his or her own action as well as on the actions taken by his or her neighbours. We provide a framework to analyse such strategic interactions when neighbourhood structure, modelled in terms of an underlying network of connections, affects payoffs. In our framework, individuals are partially informed about the structure of the social network. The introduction of incomplete information allows us to provide general results characterizing how the network structure, an individual's position within the network, the nature of games (strategic substitutes vs. complements and positive vs. negative externalities) and the level of information shape individual behaviour and payoffs. Copyright , Wiley-Blackwell.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Oxford University Press in its journal The Review of Economic Studies.

Volume (Year): 77 (2010)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 218-244

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Handle: RePEc:oup:restud:v:77:y:2010:i:1:p:218-244

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  1. Arun Sundararajan, 2004. "Local Network Effects and Network Structure," Industrial Organization, EconWPA 0412011, EconWPA.
  2. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2006. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: The Key Player," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 74(5), pages 1403-1417, 09.
  3. Galeotti, Andrea & Vega-Redondo, Fernando, 2005. "Strategic analysis in complex networks with local externalities," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1224, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
  4. Galeotti, Andrea, 2005. "Consumers networks and search equilibria," Working Papers, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences 1225, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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  12. Matthew O. Jackson & Leeat Yariv, 2007. "Diffusion of Behavior and Equilibrium Properties in Network Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 97(2), pages 92-98, May.
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  15. Matthew O. Jackson & Leo K. Simon & Jeroen M. Swinkels & William R. Zame, 2002. "Communication and Equilibrium in Discontinuous Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 70(5), pages 1711-1740, September.
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