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Who's Who in Crime Networks: Wanted - The Key Player

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  • Ballester, Coralio
  • Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
  • Zenou, Yves

Abstract

Criminals are embedded in a network of relationships. Social ties among criminals are modelled by means of a graph where criminals compete for a bounty and benefit from local interactions with their neighbours. Each criminal decides in a non-cooperative way how much crime effort they will exert. We show that the Nash equilibrium crime effort of each individual is proportional to their equilibrium Bonacich-centrality in the network, thus establishing a bridge to the sociology literature on social networks. We then analyse a policy that consists of finding and getting rid of the key player, that is, the criminal who, once removed, leads to the maximum reduction in aggregate crime. We provide a geometric characterization of the key player identified with an optimal inter-centrality measure, which takes into account both a player’s centrality and their contribution to the centrality of the others. We also provide a geometric characterization of the key group, which generalizes the key player for a group of criminals of a given size. We finally endogeneize the crime participation decision, resulting in a key player policy, which effectiveness depends on the outside opportunities available to criminals.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4421.

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Date of creation: Jun 2004
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4421

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Keywords: centrality measures; crime; key group; policies; social networks;

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References

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  1. Matt Jackson, 2003. "The Effects of Social Networks on Employment and Inequality," Theory workshop papers, UCLA Department of Economics 658612000000000032, UCLA Department of Economics.
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  8. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2003. "Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent Behavior," Working Papers 52, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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  12. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. " The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-95, September.
  13. Kenneth Burdett & Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2003. "Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1764-1777, December.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Calvo-Armengol, Antoni & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2007. "Strong and weak ties in employment and crime," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(1-2), pages 203-233, February.
  2. Sudipta Sarangi & Colin Cannonier & Bibhudutta Panda, . "Key Players and Key Groups in Teams," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University 2011-14, Department of Economics, Louisiana State University.
  3. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvo-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2005. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Player," NajEcon Working Paper Reviews 666156000000000586, www.najecon.org.
  4. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2010. "Network Games," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 77(1), pages 218-244.
  5. Sergio Currarini, & Elena Fumagalli & Fabrizio Panebianco, 2012. "Games on Networks: Direct Complements and Indirect Substitutes," Discussion Papers in Economics 13/04, Department of Economics, University of Leicester.
  6. Jan K. Brueckner & Oleg Smirnov, 2004. "Workings of the Melting Pot: Social Networks and the Evolution of Population Attributes," CESifo Working Paper Series 1320, CESifo Group Munich.
  7. Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves, 2008. "The strength of weak ties in crime," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 52(2), pages 209-236, February.
  8. Umed Temurshoev, 2008. "Who's Who in Networks. Wanted: the Key Group," Working Papers 08-08, NET Institute, revised Sep 2008.
  9. Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Crime, Location and the Housing Market," Working Paper Series, Research Institute of Industrial Economics 651, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.

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