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Crime and the labor market: a search model with optimal contracts

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Author Info
Bryan Engelhardt
Guillaume Rocheteau
Peter Rupert

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Abstract

This paper extends the Pissarides (2000) model of the labor market to include crime and punishment `a la Becker (1968). All workers, irrespective of their labor force status can commit crimes and the employment contract is determined optimally. The model is used to study, analytically and quantitatively, the effects of various labor market and crime policies. For instance, a more generous unemployment insurance system reduces the crime rate of the unemployed but its effect on the crime rate of the employed depends on job duration and jail sentences. When the model is calibrated to U.S. data, the overall effect on crime is positive but quantitatively small. Wage subsidies reduce unemployment and crime rates of employed and unemployed workers, and improve society’s welfare. Hiring subsidies reduce unemployment but they can raise the crime rate of employed workers. Crime policies (police technology and jail sentences) affect crime rates significantly but have only negligible effects on the labor market.

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Paper provided by Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in its series Working Paper with number 0715.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:fip:fedcwp:0715

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Keywords: Crime ; Unemployment ; Labor market;

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This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Shimer, Robert, 2006. "On-the-job search and strategic bargaining," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(4), pages 811-830, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Boone, Jan & van Ours, Jan C., 2004. "Effective Active Labor Market Policies," IZA Discussion Papers 1335, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
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  3. Holmlund, Bertil, 1998. " Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 100(1), pages 113-41, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  4. Robert Shimer, 2005. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(1), pages 25-49, March. [Downloadable!]
  5. Steve Machin & Costas Meghir, 2000. "Crime and economic incentives," IFS Working Papers W00/17, Institute for Fiscal Studies. [Downloadable!]
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  6. Lance Lochner, 2004. "Education, Work, and Crime: A Human Capital Approach," NBER Working Papers 10478, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Kenneth Burdett & Ricardo Lagos & Randall Wright, 2003. "Crime, Inequality, and Unemployment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(5), pages 1764-1777, December. [Downloadable!]
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  8. Garibaldi, Pietro & Wasmer, Etienne, 2001. "Labor Market Flows and Equilibrium Search Unemployment," IZA Discussion Papers 406, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
  9. Freeman, Richard B., 1999. "The economics of crime," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 52, pages 3529-3571 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  10. Grogger, Jeff, 1998. "Market Wages and Youth Crime," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 16(4), pages 756-91, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  11. Chien-Chieh Huang & Derek Laing & Ping Wang, 2004. "Crime And Poverty: A Search-Theoretic Approach," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 909-938, 08. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  12. Mortensen, Dale T & Pissarides, Christopher A, 1994. "Job Creation and Job Destruction in the Theory of Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 397-415, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  13. Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76, pages 169. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  14. Hosios, Arthur J, 1990. "On the Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(2), pages 279-98, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Margaret Stevens, 2004. "Wage-Tenure Contracts in a Frictional Labour Market: Firms' Strategies for Recruitment and Retention," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 71(2), pages 535-551, 04. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  16. Olivier Marie & Stephen Machin, 2004. "Crime And Benefit Cuts," Royal Economic Society Annual Conference 2004 134, Royal Economic Society. [Downloadable!]
  17. Lance Lochner & Enrico Moretti, 2004. "The Effect of Education on Crime: Evidence from Prison Inmates, Arrests, and Self-Reports," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 94(1), pages 155-189, March. [Downloadable!]
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  18. Christopher J. Flinn, 2006. "Minimum Wage Effects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search, Matching, and Endogenous Contact Rates," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(4), pages 1013-1062, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  19. Ken Burdett & Melvyn Coles, 2003. "Equilibrium Wage-Tenure Contracts," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(5), pages 1377-1404, 09. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  20. Bedard, Kelly & Helland, Eric, 2004. "The location of women's prisons and the deterrence effect of "harder" time," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 147-167, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  21. Barbara Petrongolo & Christopher A. Pissarides, 2001. "Looking into the Black Box: A Survey of the Matching Function," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(2), pages 390-431, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  22. Acemoglu, Daron, 1997. "Training and Innovation in an Imperfect Labour Market," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 64(3), pages 445-64, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  23. Pissarides, Christopher A, 1994. "Search Unemployment with On-the-Job Search," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 61(3), pages 457-75, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  24. Hoon, H.T. & Phelps, E.S., 1998. "Low-Wage Employment Subsidies in a Labor-Turnover Model of the 'Natural Rate'," Papers 98-004, Indiana - Center for Econometric Model Research.
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Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Manolis Galenianos & Rosalie Liccardo Pacula & Nicola Persico, 2009. "A Search-Theoretic Model of the Retail Market for Illicit Drugs," NBER Working Papers 14980, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Bryan Engelhardt, 2008. "The Effect of Employment Frictions on Crime: Theory and Estimation," Working Papers 0805, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Bryan Engelhardt & David L. Fuller, 2009. "Efficient Labor Force Participation with Search and Bargaining," Working Papers 0909, College of the Holy Cross, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2009. [Downloadable!]
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