IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/cdf/wpaper/2014-8.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organised Crime

Author

Listed:

Abstract

Policies targeted at high-crime neighbourhoods may have unintended consequences in the presence of organised crime. Whilst they reduce the incentive to commit crime at the margin, those who still choose to join the criminal organisation are hardened criminals. Large organisations take advantage of this, substituting away from membership size towards increased individual criminal activity. Aggregate crime may rise. However, as more would-be recruits move into the formal labour market, falling revenue causes a reversal of this effect. Thereafter, the policy reduces both size and individual activity simultaneously.

Suggested Citation

  • Long, Iain W., 2014. "The Storm Before the Calm? Adverse Effects of Tackling Organised Crime," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2014/8, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
  • Handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2014/8
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://carbsecon.com/wp/E2014_8.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Roland G. Fryer, 2011. "Financial Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from Randomized Trials," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 126(4), pages 1755-1798.
    2. Gary S. Becker, 1974. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    3. Abdala Mansour & Nicolas Marceau & Steeve Mongrain, 2006. "Gangs and Crime Deterrence," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 22(2), pages 315-339, October.
    4. Poret, Sylvaine & Tejedo, Cyril, 2006. "Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 99-114, March.
    5. Coralio Ballester & Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2010. "Delinquent Networks," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 8(1), pages 34-61, March.
    6. Fiorentini,Gianluca & Peltzman,Sam (ed.), 1997. "The Economics of Organised Crime," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521629553, October.
    7. Mariagiovanna Baccara & Heski Bar-Isaac, 2008. "How to Organize Crime -super-1," Review of Economic Studies, Oxford University Press, vol. 75(4), pages 1039-1067.
    8. Dan Silverman, 2004. "Street Crime And Street Culture," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 761-786, August.
    9. James E. Anderson & Oriana Bandiera, 2000. "Mafias as Enforcers," Boston College Working Papers in Economics 480, Boston College Department of Economics.
    10. Carvalho, Leandro S. & Soares, Rodrigo R., 2016. "Living on the edge: Youth entry, career and exit in drug-selling gangs," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 121(C), pages 77-98.
    11. Panu Poutvaara & Mikael Priks, 2011. "Unemployment and gang crime: can prosperity backfire?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 259-273, September.
    12. Kugler, Maurice & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Organized crime, corruption and punishment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1639-1663, September.
    13. Stergios Skaperdas, 2001. "The political economy of organized crime: providing protection when the state does not," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 2(3), pages 173-202, November.
    14. Antoni Calvó-Armengol & Yves Zenou, 2004. "Social Networks And Crime Decisions: The Role Of Social Structure In Facilitating Delinquent Behavior," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 45(3), pages 939-958, August.
    15. Garoupa, Nuno, 2000. "The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 38(2), pages 278-288, April.
    16. Dean Yang, 2008. "Can Enforcement Backfire? Crime Displacement in the Context of Customs Reform in the Philippines," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 90(1), pages 1-14, February.
    17. Roland G. Fryer, 2011. "Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence from New York City Public Schools," NBER Working Papers 16850, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Poret, Sylvaine, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 22(4), pages 465-493, December.
    19. Levitt, Steven D, 1997. "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(3), pages 270-290, June.
    20. Long, Iain W., 2013. "Recruitment to Organised Crime," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    21. PhilipJ. Cook & Jens Ludwig & Sudhir Venkatesh & AnthonyA. Braga, 2007. "Underground Gun Markets," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 117(524), pages 588-618, November.
    22. Garoupa, Nuno, 1997. "The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-295, September.
    23. H. Naci Mocan & Stephen C. Billups & Jody Overland, 2005. "A Dynamic Model of Differential Human Capital and Criminal Activity," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 72(288), pages 655-681, November.
    24. Heckman, James J. & Moon, Seong Hyeok & Pinto, Rodrigo & Savelyev, Peter A. & Yavitz, Adam, 2010. "The rate of return to the HighScope Perry Preschool Program," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(1-2), pages 114-128, February.
    25. Sah, Raaj K, 1991. "Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 99(6), pages 1272-1295, December.
    26. Polinsky, Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, 1979. "The Optimal Tradeoff between the Probability and Magnitude of Fines," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 69(5), pages 880-891, December.
    27. Lee, Li Way, 1993. "Would Harassing Drug Users Work?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(5), pages 939-959, October.
    28. Sylvaine Poret, 2002. "Paradoxical effects of law enforcement policies: the case of the illicit drug market," Post-Print hal-02960430, HAL.
    29. Anderson, James E. & Bandiera, Oriana, 2005. "Private enforcement and social efficiency," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 341-366, August.
    30. Panu Poutvaara & Mikael Priks, 2009. "Hooliganism and Police Tactics," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 11(3), pages 441-453, June.
    31. George J. Stigler, 1974. "The Optimum Enforcement of Laws," NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 55-67, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    32. Steven Shavell & A. Mitchell Polinsky, 2000. "The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 38(1), pages 45-76, March.
    33. Garoupa, Nuno, 2007. "Optimal law enforcement and criminal organization," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 461-474, July.
    34. Nuno Garoupa, 1997. "The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 11(3), pages 267-295, September.
    35. Brian Bell & Laura Jaitman & Stephen Machin, 2014. "Crime Deterrence: Evidence From the London 2011 Riots," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 0(576), pages 480-506, May.
    36. Ehrlich, Isaac, 1973. "Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(3), pages 521-565, May-June.
    37. Booth, Alison & Schiantarelli, Fabio, 1987. "The Employment Effects of a Shorter Working Week," Economica, London School of Economics and Political Science, vol. 54(214), pages 237-248, May.
    38. Juin-Jen Chang & Huei-Chung Lu & Mingshen Chen, 2005. "Organized Crime or Individual Crime? Endogenous Size of a Criminal Organization and the Optimal Law Enforcement," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 43(3), pages 661-675, July.
    39. Calmfors, Lars, 1985. "Work sharing, employment and wages," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 27(3), pages 293-309.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Long, Iain W., 2013. "Recruitment to Organised Crime," Cardiff Economics Working Papers E2013/10, Cardiff University, Cardiff Business School, Economics Section.
    2. Flores, Daniel, 2016. "Violence and law enforcement in markets for illegal goods," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(C), pages 77-87.
    3. Deng, Liuchun & Sun, Yufeng, 2017. "Criminal network formation and optimal detection policy: The role of cascade of detection," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 141(C), pages 43-63.
    4. Poret, Sylvaine, 2009. "An optimal anti-drug law enforcement policy," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(3), pages 221-228, September.
    5. Poret, Sylvaine & Tejedo, Cyril, 2006. "Law enforcement and concentration in illicit drug markets," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 99-114, March.
    6. Liu, Xiaodong & Patacchini, Eleonora & Zenou, Yves & Lee, Lung-Fei, 2011. "Criminal Networks: Who is the Key Player?," Research Papers in Economics 2011:7, Stockholm University, Department of Economics.
    7. Kugler, Maurice & Verdier, Thierry & Zenou, Yves, 2005. "Organized crime, corruption and punishment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1639-1663, September.
    8. DeAngelo, Gregory, 2012. "Making space for crime: A spatial analysis of criminal competition," Regional Science and Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 42(1-2), pages 42-51.
    9. Ken Yahagi, 2019. "Law enforcement with criminal organizations and endogenous collaboration," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 48(3), pages 351-363, December.
    10. Nuno Garoupa & Jonathan Klick & Francesco Parisi, 2006. "A law and economics perspective on terrorism," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 128(1), pages 147-168, July.
    11. Leonardo Raffo López & José Luis Segura, 2018. "La ineficacia de las políticas de represión a la oferta de drogas: una explicación alternativa," Ensayos de Economía 16782, Universidad Nacional de Colombia Sede Medellín.
    12. Anna Bonanno, 2006. "The economic analysis of offender’s choice: Old and new insights," International Review of Economics, Springer;Happiness Economics and Interpersonal Relations (HEIRS), vol. 53(2), pages 193-224, June.
    13. Kangoh Lee, 2018. "Unemployment and crime: the role of apprehension," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 59-80, February.
    14. Steven Shavell, 2003. "Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law," NBER Working Papers 9698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Ferrer, Rosa, 2010. "Breaking the law when others do: A model of law enforcement with neighborhood externalities," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(2), pages 163-180, February.
    16. Antonio Acconcia & Marcello D'Amato & Riccardo Martina, 2003. "Corruption and Tax Evasion with Competitive Bribes," CSEF Working Papers 112, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy.
    17. Paolo Buonanno & Daniel Montolio & Paolo Vanin, 2009. "Does Social Capital Reduce Crime?," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 52(1), pages 145-170, February.
    18. Isaac Ehrlich, 1996. "Crime, Punishment, and the Market for Offenses," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 10(1), pages 43-67, Winter.
    19. Panu Poutvaara & Mikael Priks, 2011. "Unemployment and gang crime: can prosperity backfire?," Economics of Governance, Springer, vol. 12(3), pages 259-273, September.
    20. Parikshit Ghosh, 2009. "Making the Punishment Fit the Crime or Taliban Justice? Optimal Penalties Without Commitment," Working papers 175, Centre for Development Economics, Delhi School of Economics.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Organised crime; crime policy; occupational choice;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • J24 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Human Capital; Skills; Occupational Choice; Labor Productivity
    • J28 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Safety; Job Satisfaction; Related Public Policy
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
    • L21 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Business Objectives of the Firm

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:cdf:wpaper:2014/8. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Yongdeng Xu (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/ecscfuk.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.