This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Monotone Equilibria in Bayesian Games of Strategic Complementarities

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Van Zandt, Timothy
Vives, Xavier

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

For Bayesian games of strategic complementarities, we provide a constructive proof of the existence of a greatest and a least Bayes-Nash equilibrium - each one in strategies monotone in type - if the payoff to a player displays increasing differences in own action and the profile of types, and if the posteriors are increasing in type with respect to first-order stochastic dominance (e.g. if types are affiliated). The result holds for multidimensional action and type spaces and also for continuous and discrete type distributions. It uses an intermediate result on monotone comparative statics under uncertainty, which implies that the extremal equilibria increase when there is a first-order stochastic dominant shift in beliefs. We provide an application to strategic information revelation in games of voluntary disclosure.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4103.asp
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: CEPR Discussion Papers are free to download for our researchers, subscribers and members. If you fall into one of these categories but have trouble downloading our papers, please contact us at subscribers@cepr.org

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Publisher Info
Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 4103.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: Nov 2003
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:4103

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Centre for Economic Policy Research, 53--56 Great Sutton Street, London EC1V 0DG
Phone: 44 - 20 - 7183 8801
Fax: 44 - 20 - 7183 8820

Order Information:
Email:

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: ().

Related research
Keywords: Cournot tatônnement; first-order stochastic dominance; incomplete information; monotone comparative statics; supermodular games; voluntary disclosure;

Other versions of this item:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports: References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Xavier Vives, 2001. "Oligopoly Pricing: Old Ideas and New Tools," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 026272040x, January.
  2. David McAdams, 2003. "Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 71(4), pages 1191-1214, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. McAdams, David, 2002. "Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information," Working papers 4248-02, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
  4. Susan Athey, 2002. "Monotone Comparative Statics Under Uncertainty," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 187-223, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Okuno-Fujiwara, Masahiro & Postlewaite, Andrew & Suzumura, Kotaro, 1990. "Strategic Information Revelation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 57(1), pages 25-47, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Vives, Xavier, 1990. "Nash equilibrium with strategic complementarities," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 19(3), pages 305-321. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  7. Paul Milgrom & Robert Weber, 1981. "Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information," Discussion Papers 428R, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
  8. Athey, Susan, 2001. "Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 69(4), pages 861-89, July.
    Other versions:
  9. M Ali Khan & Yeneng Sun, 1996. "Non-Atomic Games on Loeb Spaces," Economics Working Paper Archive 374, The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics, revised Aug 1996.
  10. Milgrom, Paul R & Weber, Robert J, 1982. "A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 50(5), pages 1089-1122, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  11. Athey, S., 1996. "Characterizing Properties of Stochastic Objective Functions," Working papers 96-1, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. ROCHET, Jean-Charles & VIVES, Xavier, 2004. "Coordination Failures and the Lender of Last Resort : Was Bagehot Right After All?," IDEI Working Papers 294, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Jozsef Sakovics & Jakub Steiner, 2008. "Who Matters in Coordination Problems?," ESE Discussion Papers 190, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
  3. Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2008. "Network Games," Economics Working Papers ECO2008/07, European University Institute. [Downloadable!]
  4. Philip J Reny, 2005. "On the Existence of Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games," Levine's Working Paper Archive 784828000000000413, David K. Levine. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Geir Asheim & Seung Yoo, 2008. "Coordinating under incomplete information," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 12(4), pages 293-313, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  6. Eugen Kovac & Jakub Steiner, 2008. "Reversibility in Dynamic Coordination Problems," ESE Discussion Papers 183, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  7. Arun Sundararajan, 2008. "Local Network Effects and Complex Network Structure," Contributions to Theoretical Economics, Berkeley Electronic Press, vol. 7(1), pages 1319-1319. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Stephen Morris & Hyun Song Shin, 2007. "Common Belief Foundations of Global Games," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000001638, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  9. Mathevet, Laurent, . "A contraction principle for finite global games," Working Papers 1243, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  10. Francesca Stroffolini, 2009. "Access Profit-Sharing Regulation with Information Transmission and Acquisition," CSEF Working Papers 214, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  11. Olivier Armantier & Jean-Pierre Florens & Jean-Francois Richard, 2008. "Approximation of Nash equilibria in Bayesian games," Journal of Applied Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 23(7), pages 965-981. [Downloadable!]
  12. Matvos, Gregor & Ostrovsky, Michael, 2006. "Strategic Proxy Voting," Research Papers 1964, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business. [Downloadable!]
  13. Xavier Vives, 2007. "Games of strategic complementarities: an application to Bayesian games," Spanish Economic Review, Springer, vol. 9(4), pages 237-247, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  14. Mason, Robin & Valentinyi, Akos, 2004. "Independence and Heterogeneity in Games of Incomplete Information," CEPR Discussion Papers 4177, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? No RePEc service, like IDEAS, charges for the use or the display of bibliographic data.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-29.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.