We develop a model of strategic networks that captures two distinctive features of interfirm collaboration: bilateral agreements and nonexclusive relationships. Our analysis highlights the relationship between market competition, firms' incentives to invest in R&D, and the architecture of collaboration networks. In the absence of firm rivalry, the complete network, inhere each firm collaborates with all others, is uniquely stable, industry-profit maximizing, and efficient. By contrast, under strong market rivalry the complete network is stable, but intermediate levels of collaboration and asymmetric networks are more attractive from a collective viewpoint. This suggests that competing firms may have excessive incentives to form collaborative links. Copyright 2001 by the RAND Corporation.
Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for
download. To find whether it is available, there are three
options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page
whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be
available.
Volume (Year): 32 (2001) Issue (Month): 4 (Winter) Pages: 686-707 Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML
(with abstract),
plain text
(with abstract),
BibTeX,
RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite),
ReDIF
Goyal, S. & Moraga-Gonzalez, J.L., 2000.
"R&D Networks,"
Econometric Institute Report
EI 2000-26A Revision_Date, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Econometric Institute.
[Downloadable!]
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Cited by: (explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)
MAULEON, Ana & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, Jose & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 2005.
"Networks of manufacturers and retailers,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2005041, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
MAULEON, Ana & SEMPERE-MONERRIS, JosŽ & VANNETELBOSCH, Vincent J., 2004.
"R&D networks among unionized firms,"
CORE Discussion Papers
2004071, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
[Downloadable!]
Andrea Galeotti & Sanjeev Goyal & Matthew O. Jackson & Fernando Vega-Redondo & Leeat Yariv, 2008.
"Network Games,"
Economics Working Papers
ECO2008/07, European University Institute.
[Downloadable!]
J. Vernon Henderson & Mohammad Arzaghi, 2005.
"Networking Off Madison Avenue,"
Working Papers
05-15, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
[Downloadable!]
Other versions: